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Abstract
This dissertation seeks to establish whether the presence or activities of a partner or partners in South
Africa creates (or is at risk of creating) a permanent establishment for that partner, the partnership or the
co-partners in South Africa.
At the outset, the major legal and fiscal consequences of a partnership under South African law are
investigated. The unique legal and fiscal treatment of a partnership as a mere aggregate of persons that is
treated as fiscally transparent under South African law is relevant to determine the potential application of
double taxation agreements to partnerships or their partners. Once the terms of a double taxation
agreement are found to apply in the circumstances, the creation of a permanent establishment in terms
thereof becomes relevant.
The different types of partnerships and partners under South African partnership law are set out and their
differentiating characteristics analysed in an effort to identify whether the activities or presence of certain
partners are more at risk of giving rise to a permanent establishment than others. In a commercial context,
the important distinction is drawn between ordinary and extraordinary partners as very different commercial
consequences attach to these partners. In particular, whereas ordinary partners automatically derive an
implied authority or mutual mandate to manage the business of the partnership as agents of their co-
partners by virtue of the partnership agreement, extraordinary partners are excluded from the mutual
mandate. The implied authority amongst partners becomes particularly relevant when considering one of
the alternative tests for creating a permanent establishment that appear in the prevalent model tax
conventions commonly used in the South African context, in terms of which the existence of authority is
one of the required elements for the creation of a permanent establishment.
The special rules surrounding the source of partnership income is investigated as a means of establishing
jurisdiction to tax under South African domestic source rules. The impact of legislation on the South African
source rules pertaining to partnerships as developed under the common law is critically analysed and the
relevance of source rules in the permanent establishment context is evaluated. It is submitted that it is
premature to consider the rules surrounding the creation of a permanent establishment under the terms of
a double taxation agreement before it is established that the relevant contracting state has the requisite
jurisdiction to tax and furthermore that the terms of that double taxation agreement apply to the matter at
hand.
Finally, the relevant articles of the model tax conventions commonly used in the South African context are
discussed with specific focus on the unique attributes of a partnership that may impact on the creation of a
permanent establishment for the partner or partners by virtue of the presence or activities of a partner or
iv
the partners in South Africa. The risk of creating a permanent establishment by virtue of the presence or
activities of an ordinary partner in South Africa is contrasted with that of an extraordinary partner. It is
concluded that the activities or presence of ordinary partners (as opposed to extraordinary partners) are
particularly at risk of creating a permanent establishment in South Africa, although it is acknowledged that
certain requirements will have to be met on the facts of each case before a permanent establishment will
be found to exist.
vGlossary / Abbreviations
Abbreviation Full term
AD Appellate Division
Art / Arts Article / Articles
BPR Binding Private Ruling
DTA Double Taxation Agreement
DTC Davis Tax Committee
IBFD International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD MTC OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital
OECD Partnership Report The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships
Para. / Paras. Paragraph / Paragraphs
PE Permanent establishment
S / Ss Section / Sections
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADC MTC SADC Model Tax Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income
SARS South African Revenue Service
SCA Supreme Court of Appeal
The Act Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962, as amended from time to time
TLAA Taxation Laws Amendment Act
UN United Nations
UN MTC UN Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and
Developing Countries
VAT Value-Added Tax
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11. Introduction to the law of partnership
1.1 The relevance of conflict of laws in the context of taxation
A partnership is a form of business enterprise that has stood the test of time (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:162).
The legal consequences of forming a partnership flow from the law of partnership as developed over many
years. In the context of cross-border partnerships1 that have a presence in more than one jurisdiction, the
question arises which law of partnership should determine the legal consequences of that partnership.
Sovereign states, like South Africa, enjoy national sovereignty over their territory (Edwards & Kahn,
2003:para. 281). As a result, domestic laws invariably differ between countries although governing similar
subject matters. Countries have developed their own rules of private international law, also referred to as
conflict of laws, to determine solve dispute involving
foreign elements (Edwards & Kahn, 2003:para. 281). Vogel points out that private international law remains
relevant in the context of taxation insofar as taxation depends on relationships emanating from private law,
for example establishing ownership (1986:13).
different legal subjects and can be contrasted with public law which governs the (vertical) relationship
between legal subjects and the state (Davel & Jordaan, 2005:1). The so-
ie the domestic law governing the contract, is based on an agreement between the parties as to which
328). However, subjects of a
given state are not at liberty to choose between the fiscal rules of different jurisdictions by way of a choice
of law clause because fiscal rules flow from the vertical relationship between the state and its subjects (not
from the horizontal relationship between subjects that can usually be varied by agreement).
(Olivier & Honiball, 2011:1).
Consequently there is no set of uniformly applicable international taxing rules; rather, as noted by Olivier
and Honiball, the concept of international tax relates to the international features of domestic tax laws
(2011:1).2 This paper is specifically written from a South African viewpoint and the particular focus is on the
considerations that should be relevant to a South African court when considering the taxation of the income
of a cross-border partnership in the hands of the partnership or its partners.
1 -
partners in South Africa as well as outside South Africa.
2 Vogel and Rust describe the concept of international tax law as referring to the domestic and international rules governing so-called
- e only imposed
by countries in terms of their own domestic legislation and not at an international level (2011:1).
2Countries only impose and usually only collect3 taxes in accordance with their own domestic tax laws
(Vogel, 1986:14). The levy of taxes by a state is therefore in essence not a conflict of laws that can be
resolved by the rules of private international law but rather represents a state exercising its sovereignty
over its territory or subjects. States may only impose taxes on income if the particular state is sufficiently
connected to the income under consideration (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:9). States may therefore impose
taxes on income if, under that domestic laws, it has
involved (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:9-10).4 Special rules
have developed in South African domestic law regarding the source of partnership profits, which will be
considered in chapter 4 below.
Although the partnership is a common form of business enterprise around the world, the legal
consequences and tax treatment of partnerships often vary significantly between different jurisdictions.
When a court is called upon to determine the tax consequences of a foreign cross-border entity, the court
is likely to consider the legal aspects of that entity under the (foreign) law of its country of formation and to
tax that entity according to the domestic tax rules applicable to the domestic business form that is most
similar to that foreign entity (Avery Jones et al., 2002:289).5 When confronted with a foreign cross-border
partnership, a South African court should therefore compare the attributes of that foreign body with the
attributes of a South African domestic partnership to determine whether the business should be taxed as a
partnership in the South African sense of the word. Assuming the foreign entity is regarded as the equivalent
of a partnership in terms of South African law or a foreign partnership, the court should naturally also have
regard to any statutory provisions in South African domestic law that may have an impact on the taxation
of partnerships.
A cross-border partnership and its partners will usually also be subject to the partnership and fiscal laws of
a foreign country, which could entail a different legal and tax treatment to South Africa. Bodies of persons
that are taxed at entity level in one jurisdiction but treated as fiscally transparent in a different jurisdiction,
such as partnerships or trusts (Oguttu, 2009:51). In recent years,
certain amendments have been made to South African fiscal legislation in an effort to reduce the occurrence
of hybrid entities in the context of partnerships, as will be discussed in the next chapter below.
International transactions often lead to double taxation. Juridical double taxation, also referred to as legal
double taxation, arises where a taxpayer is taxed on the same income on more than one occasion (Olivier
3 In COT, Federation of Rhodesia v McFarland
attribu
laws. Countries may, however, contract out of the revenue rule (which is the rule of international law that courts will not enforce the
revenue laws of other countries), as more recently illustrated in Krok v CSARS, 2015 JOL 33672 (SCA), 78 SATC 1.
4 -48).
5 This approach is (Avery Jones et al., 2002:289). A few countries do not follow this
general rule (Avery Jones et al., 2002:289) but South Africa does not seem to be one of them. This also appears from the reference
to the closest internal law equivalent approach by South African academic writer, Oguttu (2009:52-53).
3& Honiball, 2011:6).6 Cross-border partnerships that constitute hybrid entities are particularly at risk of
giving rise to economic double taxation due to the imposition of taxes by different jurisdictions at different
levels (for example, imposing taxes at partnership level in one jurisdiction whereas another jurisdiction may
tax the individual partners).
A common method of reducing the occurrence of juridical double taxation is the entering into of double
taxation agreements between different states. South Africa has entered
into a number of DTAs with other states in addition to promulgating certain provisions in South African
domestic law aimed at the avoidance of double taxation (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:6). DTAs do not introduce
in terms of its domestic laws so as to avoid
double taxation and prevent tax evasion in situations where the particular DTA applies (Vogel & Rust,
2015:28-29). The application of DTAs therefore does not lead to a conflict of laws as the countries that are
involved will only impose taxes based on their own domestic tax laws albeit in a limited fashion (Vogel &
Rust, 2015:23).
In order to promote uniformity across DTAs, several international organisations have developed model tax
treaties7 as a basis for negotiating DTAs (Olivier, 2002:868). Building on
the preparatory work of the League of Nations, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development first issued a Draft MTC in
1963 and has since then published updated versions at an increasing pace (Vogel & Rust, 2015:20-21).
The OECD MTC8 currently enjoys the widest recognition as the basis for negotiating tax treaties around
the world (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:268). Although South Africa is not a member of the OECD, it is named
in the full version of the OECD MTC and Commentary as one of 33 non-OECD jurisdictions which generally
agree with the OECD approach but have otherwise noted their positions where they disagree (OECD,
2014:p-3-p-4). The United Nations (hereafter referred to has developed its own MTC. The UN
first published a Draft MTC in 1980. The UN MTC9 follows the general wording and structure of the OECD
MTC, however, it provides a more suitable basis for the negotiation of tax treaties with developing countries
as it proposes certain articles that are more favourable to the country having source jurisdiction as opposed
to the country having residence jurisdiction (UN, 2011:vi). An important development in the South African
context is the Draft MTC that was first proposed by the Southern African Development Community
(herea in 2001. The SADC MTC10 is based on the OECD MTC while including
6 two (or
more) tax jurisdiction Juridical double taxation
should be distinguished from economic double taxation, which refers to the situation where the same income is taxed more than once
but in the hands of different taxpayers (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:6).
7 Also referred to as model tax conventions.
8 Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. The current version was published in 2014.
9 Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries. The current version was published in 2011.
10 Model Tax Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income.
The current version was published in 2011. Krause refers to a 2013 version of the SADC MTC (2015:11), however, this later version
does not seem to be publicly available.
4elements of the UN MTC (SADC, 2011:2). Since the SADC MTC was finalised in 2011, it is likely that South
Africa, as a member of the SADC, will increasingly rely on the articles of the SADC MTC when negotiating
DTAs in future (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:5). Although there are several other MTCs that are not mentioned
here,11 the MTCs published by the OECD, UN and SADC seem to be the most relevant in the South African
context (currently in that order).12
MTCs are not binding documents but rather form the basis for the negotiation of DTAs between countries
insofar as those countries agree to the articles of the relevant MTC. Once two or more countries have validly
entered into a DTA, that DTA binds the signatories to the DTA as a legally enforceable document (Vogel &
Rust, 2015:7).
With each update of an MTC, the OECD, UN and SADC publish detailed commentaries. Like the MTCs,
the commentaries do not constitute binding documents. However, the commentary on the widely
serves as a useful guide for the
interpretation and application of that MTC and any ensuing DTA (Vogel & Rust, 2015:7). The OECD
Commentary forms the basis of the commentaries on the UN MTC and the SADC MTC (hereafter referred
, with added variations based on
the relevant MTC. When interpreting a particular DTA, a South African court, although not bound by the
relevant commentary, may have regard to the relevant commentary insofar as it assists the court in the
interpretation and application of the provisions contained in the DTA. This was notably illustrated in SIR v
Downing, 1975 (4) SA 518 (A), 37 SATC 249, where the Appellate Division (hereafter referred to as the
relied on the provisions of the OECD Commentary at the time to determine whether a permanent
establishment had been created in South Africa in terms of the DTA
between South Africa and Switzerland.13
In its report entitled The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships (hereafter referred
he OECD identified the divergent tax treatment by different
jurisdictions of cross-border partnerships and other hybrid entities as an overriding difficulty in the
application of DTAs to these bodies (OECD, 1999: R(15)-6). Whereas some jurisdictions (such as South
Africa, as will be discussed in 1.2.2 other
jurisdictions impose tax on the partnership itself as a taxable entity (OECD, 1999: R(15)-6).
11 Such as the United States MTC and technical explanation thereof as well as MTCs developed by other countries, including South
Africa (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:272). According to research conducted by Krause, the South African MTC combines the MTCs of the
OECD, UN and SADC (2015:11). The so-called South African MTC does not seem to be a publicly available document.
12 Given that the OECD MTC is currently the most widely recognised MTC followed by the UN MTC (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:268) and
the SADC MTC is expected to be increasingly relied on by South Africa when entering into DTAs in future (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:5).
13 More recently, the Tax Court in ITC 13276 had to consider whether a PE was created by way of the rendering of services by
employees of a
ely
disregarded the approach as recommended by the commentary. Note that decisions of the Tax Court do not create binding legal
precedent in South Africa.
51.2 South African domestic partnerships
1.2.1 The legal nature of a partnership
with another" (Henning, 2006:para. 252). In Pezzutto v Dreyer, 1992 2 All SA 81 (A) at 91, the AD described
a partnership the carrying on of a business (to which each of the partners contributes) in common for
the joint benefit of the parties with a view to making a profit .
Although other common business forms, such as companies and close corporations, are allowed to have
only one member, a partnership must have at least two members at any given time (Olivier & Honiball,
2011:162). Partnerships may be entered into between natural or juristic persons or a combination of both
(Olivier & Honiball, 2011:162) and there is no longer a limit of 20 partners under South African law.14
The essential requirements, commonly referred to as the essentialia of a partnership can be described as
the special characteristics of a partnership agreement that distinguishes it from all other agreements (De
Wet & Yeats, 1964:559). The essentialia of a partnership were accepted into the South African common
law in the seminal case of Joubert v Tarry & Co., 1915 TPD 277, where De Villiers JP at 281 accepted
requirements as the essentialia for establishing a partnership in terms of South
African law. The essentialia are: First, each partner must make, or bind himself to make, some contribution
to the partnership Secondly, the business of the partnership
must be carried on for the benefit of all the partners. Thirdly, the object of the partnership must be to make
a profit. Fourthly, there must be a legitimate contract establishing the partnership.15
A partnership is accordingly a particular kind of contract that is entered into between two or more partners
as the parties to the contract. A partnership contract must therefore meet the ordinary validity requirements
of the law of contract before a partnership can come into existence (De Wet & Yeats, 1964:557). The
general requirements of a binding contract include, in addition to consensus between the parties, that the
parties must have the capacity to enter into the agreement, the anticipated performance must not be
impossible, and adherence to the principle of legality and the relevant formalities to contract (Van der Merwe
et al., 2007:8). The AD in Bester v Van Niekerk, 1960 (2) SA 779 (A) held that
requirements does not in fact constitute an essentialia of a partnership but rather an ordinary validity
14 partnerships for the
purpose of carrying on a business or making a gain that had more than 20 members. Such a partnership would terminate upon the
limit of 20 members being exceeded (Henning, 2006:para. 269). The 1973 Companies Act was repealed by s 224 of the Companies
15 There is some controversy as to whether the fourth requirement truly qualifies as one of the essentialia of a partnership.
English tra essentialia
1854:11).
6requirement applicable to all types of contracts.16 De Wet and Yeats (1964:559) therefore conclude that the
essential requirements of a partnership include a contribution by each partner to the partnership business,
which business is to be carried on for the joint benefit of the partners with the intention of making a profit.17
Although the object of a partnership agreement must be lawful, this ordinary validity requirement does not
constitute an essentialia of a partnership (Bamford, 1982:18).18
South African law recognises several different types of partnerships (Henning, 2006:para. 256).
Partnerships may be divided into universal versus particular partnerships and ordinary versus extraordinary
partnerships (Davis et al., 2011:326). A universal partnership constitutes an overall pooling of assets or
income whereas a particular partnership will have definite parameters (Davis et al., 2011:326). In a
commercial context, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary partnerships is vital. Under the
common law, extraordinary partnerships include anonymous partnerships and en commandite partnerships
(De Wet & Yeats, 1964:584). While ordinary partners are exposed to the normal consequences of a
partnership agreement, anonymous (also referred to as silent) or en commandite partners are able to limit
their exposure (Henning, 2006:para. 258). As a result, the involvement of extraordinary partners in the
business of the partnership is usually limited.
Where the essentialia of a partnership are present (which applies to all types of partnerships), the court in
Joubert v Tarry held at 281 that a court must hold a partnership to exist unless the parties to the contract
have agreed otherwise.19 As can be seen from Sacks v CIR, 1946 AD 31, 13 SATC 343, in which the AD
recognised a verbal partnership agreement, a partnership contract need not be in writing. Save for having
to conclude a valid contract that meet the relevant essentialia, a partnership contract is not subject to any
special formalities. Persons entering into a partnership agreement may of course agree to certain
formalities, for example, that their partnership agreement must be in writing and signed by all the partners
(Henning, 2006:para. 271). When compared with, for instance, incorporating a company in terms of the
2008 Companies Act, it seems that a partnership remains largely an unregulated form of a business
enterprise and need generally not even be registered.20
16 This principle as established in Bester v Van Niekerk has been reiterated in such recent case law as Butters v Mncora, 2012 JOL
28653 (SCA).
17 Joubert v Tarry that the agreement
between the parties is not a partnership, notwithstanding that the essential requirements of a partnership may have been met
(1964:559).
18 See further Bamford (1982:18-21) for a discussion of lawfulness as a requirement of any partnership. Today, the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 is the supreme law of South Africa and s 39(2) thereof requires that the courts develop the common
law in a manner that promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
19 For a contrary view, see Isaacs v Isaacs, 1949 (2) All SA 147 (C), where the court remarked that not every contract that meets the
essentialia of a partnership will necessarily be held to constitute a partnership. See also Hoheisen v CIR, 5 SATC 207 1931 CPD, in
which it was held that a partnership contract must be given effect to before a partnership can be said to exist. Based on the dictum in
Hoheisen t to establishing a partnership (2011:163).
essentialia, a partnership
comes into existence irrespective of whether the parties choose to label the arrangement as a partnership.
20 Bamford noted that partnerships need not be registered (1982:24), which statement still holds true today, more than three decades
later. See De Wet and Yeats for a brief discussion of the registration requirements that existed in respect of certain partnerships
established in Natal, Transvaal and the Cape Province prior to South Africa becoming a Union (1964:557-558).
7The result of such an informal system regulating partnerships is, however, that parties may enter into a
partnership agreement without realising the implications thereof. Indeed, in Joubert v Tarry a partnership
was found to exist notwithstanding that the parties to the agreement chose to label it as a lease agreement.
Parties may furthermore not realise that even a single transaction could amount to a partnership if the
relevant essentialia of a partnership are met, as was expressly held by the AD in Bester v Van Niekerk at
785. More recently, in Butters v Mncora, 2012 JOL 28653 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereafter
held at para. 18 that a tacit universal partnership had been entered into between
two cohabitees and confirmed that all partnerships, including universal partnerships, can be entered into
tacitly by the conduct of the parties (in spite of previous views to the contrary).21
Where a partnership has been created in terms of South African domestic law, it is not regulated by any
one piece of comprehensive legislation (as compared to South African companies that are largely regulated
in terms of the 2008 Companies Act).22 Rather than legislation, the primary source of South African
partnership law is the common law (Henning, 2006:para. 254). The South African common law is in
substance based on Roman-Dutch law. In the context of partnership law, the common law was influenced
significantly by the writings of the French legal writer, Pothier (Henning, 2006:para. 254).
With the exception of Scotland and certain Delaware partnerships, most common law jurisdictions do not
regard partnerships as legal persons having legal capacity (Avery Jones et al., 2002:298). According to
Henning, the South African courts (like most other common law countries) have generally followed the
aggregate approach (as opposed to the entity approach) in dealing with partnerships (2014:150). Under
the aggregate approach, a partnership is not treated as an entity in its own right, but rather as an aggregate
of persons (Henning, 2014:150). As the partnership is only an aggregate of persons, all partnership property
is directly owned by the partners in undivided shares (Henning, 2006:para. 277).
the partnership property is determined by the terms of the partnership agreement (De Wet & Yeats,
1964:571). Any change in the identity of the partners (for example, when a partner exits the partnership or
a new partner is introduced) results in a dissolution of that partnership and the creation of a new partnership
between the remaining partners (Davis et al., 2011:332). In terms of the aggregate approach the legal
position is therefore established by looking through the partnership and considering the attributes of the
individual partners. On the other hand, the entity approach, which is followed in many civil law countries,
regards the partnership as a quasi-person in its own right (Henning, 2006:para. 277).
21 Earlier contradictory views that a partnership universorum bonorum could only come into existence by way of an express agreement
between the parties, was, for instance, followed in Annabhay v Ramlall, 1960 (3) SA 802 (D) (Henning, 2006:para. 257 fn. 34).
22 There have been several calls for the development of partnership legislation (Henning & Snyman, 1997:685). Although a special
limited partnership was introduced by way of legislation in the Cape Province and Natal prior to South Africa becoming a Union, this
legislation has since been repealed.
8In certain instances even a South African partnership may be treated as an entity in its own right apart from
the partners.23 This only applies where specific provision is made, usually by way of statute, to override the
general principle flowing from the aggregate approach. Although the courts have in the past indicated that
partnerships could be afforded legal personality in some respects, the ratio of such case law does not seem
to extend beyond the special treatment of partnerships in the law of insolvency.24 In the context of civil
procedure, the SCA in DF Scott (EP) (Pty) Ltd v Golden Valley Supermarket, 2002 (3) All SA 1 (A) reiterated
that the procedural rules of court do not transform a partnership into a legal entity.
In terms of South African common law, a partnership is therefore not regarded as a legal entity separate
from the partners carrying on the business of the partnership (De Koker & Williams, 2016:para. 11.1).
Watermeyer CJ, writing for the AD in Sacks, confirmed at 40 that partnership assets are owned by all the
partners jointly in undivided shares. The court further remarked that, subject to the partnership agreement,
all partnership receipts and accruals are acquired by the partners jointly in undivided shares and the
partners only become entitled to their proportionate share of the profit once the partnership accounts have
been rendered in accordance with the partnership agreement. The result is that the income flows through
the partnership to be taxed only in the hands of the partners themselves.
1.2.2 Introduction to the taxation of partnership income25
A partnership essentially involves the conducting of a business by way of a joint effort or venture26 for the
purpose of realising a profit. This raises the question of how partnership profits should be taxed.
That a partnership is not a separate legal entity was upheld in an income tax context in Chipkin (Natal) (Pty)
Ltd v CSARS, 2005 (5) SA 566 (SCA), 67 SATC 243. The SCA in Chipkin confirmed at 30 that a partnership
is not a taxpayer for South African income tax purposes. This is because a partnership is not a legal entity
23 - gate approach, which notably includes the law of insolvency and the
law of civil procedure, see Henning (2014:152-167). Avery Jones et al. note that common law jurisdictions, although usually not
regarding partnerships as legal entities, often treat partnerships as commercial entities from a practical viewpoint (2002:298).
24 In Silbert & Co. v Evans & Co., 1912 TPD 425, the Transvaal Provincial Division, in an insolvency matter, noted at 441 that
partnerships are treated as separate legal persons in some respects. In the subsequent case of Potchefstroom Dairies and Industries
Co., Ltd. v Standard Fresh Milk Supply Co., 1913 TPD 506, two of the judges who formed part of the bench in Silbert considered the
legal nature of a partnership based on Silbert. Bristo
individual is so far analogous to a persona that it may be called a quasi-persona
an undue extension of the ratio in Silbert, which was limited to the position of partnerships in the law of insolvency. Moreover, the
court in Potchefstroom Diaries appears to have decided the matter at hand based on the role of the law of agency in the context of
partnerships, which would render t obiter in nature.
25 A brief overview of the income tax treatment of partnerships is given, which is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the tax
consequences of a partnership. See, in this regard, Olivier and Honiball (2011:161-189).
26 tween
juristic persons. A joint venture is not in itself a form of a business enterprise under South African law. Joint ventures are often no
more than contractual arrangements between a number of parties entered into for the purpose of working together on a particular
project. A joint venture does not necessarily amount to a partnership in law, although a partnership may be created if a particular joint
venture meets the essentialia of a valid partnership agreement (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:162). See, for instance, Bester v Van Niekerk
essentialia are met.
9at common law and is not included in the definition of 27 in s 1 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962
. In accordance with the judgment in Chipkin, a South African partnership
is not taxed on the partnership income at partnership level, but rather the individual partners are taxed in
their personal capacities at their individual rates on their proportionate share of the partnership income.28
Olivier and Honiball are of the view that any amount flowing from a partnership to its partners can only be
seen as a distribution of the partnership profit owing to that partner since a partnership itself does not have
juristic personality under South African law (2011:186).
Partnerships are also subject to certain provisions in the Act that are aimed specifically at the taxation of
partnerships. Section 24H of the Act is an important statutory provision that impacts on the taxation of
partnerships in certain respects, especially in the context of extraordinary partnerships.29 The provisions of
s 24H seem to apply to a partnership as well as 30 as defined in s 1 of the Act.
At common law the receipts and accruals of a partnership are considered to be acquired by the partners
jointly in undivided shares. However, in terms of s 24H of the Act, the partnership income is deemed to
have been received by or accrued to the individual partners in their proportionate shares on the date on
which such income was received by or accrued to the partners in common.31 The partners are therefore
deemed to have received their proportionate share of the income once it accrues to the partnership, which
constitutes a deviation from the common law rule that was laid down in Sacks that partners only become
entitled to partnership profits once accounts are rendered in accordance with the partnership agreement.
Each partner is furthermore allowed to claim a proportionate share of any deduction or allowance that would
have been available to the partnership had it been a taxable entity under the Act, in the same proportion as
the income that was deemed to have been received by or accrued to the relevant partner.32
When partners dispose of their share in the partnership or part thereof, they are in fact disposing of their
share in the underlying assets of the partnership. Where the partner had claimed a proportionate share of
deductions or allowances in relation to the partnership assets, that partner may realise a recoupment on
the disposal of the relevant share in the underlying assets, as was the case in Chipkin.
27 rtfolio of
a collective investment scheme while expressly excluding a foreign partnership.
28 In delivering a concurring minority judgment in Van der Merwe v SIR, 1977 (1) All SA 591 (A), Trollip JA, with respect, inadvertently
created the impression that a partnership could have a taxable income in its own right. The court in Chipkin, however, confirmed that
a partnership could not have a taxable income as it is not a taxpayer for purposes of the Act.
29 See Appendix A for the full wording of s 24H.
30 See A oreign
31 In terms of s 24H(5)(a).
32 In terms of s 24H(5)(b). Olivier and Honiball point out that this may create problems in practice, since partners may not necessarily
share in the income and losses of the partnership in equal proportions (2011:170). See 2.5 below for a discussion of the limitations
applicable to limited partners in terms of this section.
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The South African approach to the taxation of the income of a partnership is therefore to almost disregard
the partnership and to tax all the partners on their proportionate share of the partnership income.
Partnerships are popular in cross-border dealings as a result of their flexible nature and lack of formalities
(Olivier & Honiball, 2011:162). One would also expect to see an increase in cross-border partnerships
between persons of different jurisdictions due to globalisation. Where a partnership has a presence or
activities in South Africa, the South African Revenue Service (hereafter referred t may be
entitled to collect taxes in respect of the appropriate share of the partnership profits.
As explained above, South Africa may generally impose taxes on income based on
over the taxpayer over the partnership income (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:9-10).
Special rules have developed in South African domestic law regarding the source of partnership profits in
a cross-border situation. The source of partnership income will be considered in chapter 4 below, together
with the impact of legislation that may have altered the South African common law in this regard.
A cross-border partnership, especially one constituting a hybrid entity, may naturally give rise to double
taxation. This is because South Africa (for example, as the source country) and a foreign country (for
fiscal laws. Economic double taxation will often be encountered in the context of cross-border partnerships
as different jurisdictions may potentially impose taxes at different levels, depending on whether a particular
jurisdiction regards the partnership as a taxable entity or not.
The application of a DTA (if one exists between the two countries) should not lead to a conflict of laws but
may require one of the two countries to give up its right to tax the particular income in a particular situation
in order to avoid double taxation.
The term PE is a concept that appears in DTAs and is now also used in South African domestic legislation
in a few instances.33 As will be more fully explored in chapter 5 below, the existence of a PE allows the
country in which the PE is located to exercise its domestic taxing rights in respect of the profits that are
attributable to the PE of a non-resident enterprise.
1.3 Research question
The main goal of this dissertation is to determine whether the presence or activities of a partner or partners
in South Africa creates (or is at risk of creating) a PE for that partner, the partnership or the co-partners in
33 Most notably, a PE is defined in s 1 of the Act with reference to the OECD MTC and the term appears in para. 2(1)(b)(ii) of the
Eighth Schedule to the Act, in terms of which assets of non-residents are subject to South African capital gains tax if those assets are
effectively connected with a PE of a non-resident in South Africa.
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South Africa. The wider or secondary question of this dissertation, which is a necessary first step to
answering the main research question, is whether South African law attaches unique or special legal and
fiscal attributes to a partnership which may impact on the likelihood or relevance of creating a PE for the
partners or partnership in South Africa.
The different consequences that attach to ordinary versus extraordinary partners will be considered in
chapter 2 below. Throughout the rest of this paper a comparison will be drawn between ordinary versus
extraordinary partners in answering the main research question as described above.
1.4 Research method
In order to answer the research question, data will be collected from primary resources such as the South
African common law and domestic legislation addressing the legal nature and income tax treatment of
partnerships. Secondary sources, such as academic writings, will also be relied on in the context of South
African domestic partnership and related fiscal laws.
The term PE will be investigated in the context of a cross-border partnership. As the term PE has been
extensively considered and debated on an international level, international sources such as academic
writings and the relevant commentaries will be referred to insofar as they may be of assistance in the
interpretation of the term PE in the context of cross-border partnerships.
1.5 Limitations of scope
The research question is aimed at determining the risk of creating a PE in South Africa by virtue of the
presence or activities of a partner or partners in South Africa. An exhaustive analysis of the term PE as
may be relevant in other contexts will therefore not be undertaken as this will not bring us any closer to
answering the main research question. The consequences of having created a PE is a separate enquiry
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
A detailed comparison between the law of partnership in civil law and common law jurisdictions is outside
the scope of this paper. Rather, this paper will focus on the considerations that a South African court should
take into account when deciding whether a PE of a cross-border partnership has been created in South
Africa, assuming it will be the equivalent of a partnership in terms of South African law or a foreign
partnership.34 As such, the discussion of partnership law will be limited to South African domestic
partnership law, which is what a South African court will rely on
34 gn
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-border partnership,
even if such a partnership was established outside of South Africa.35 The unique or special legal and fiscal
attributes that South African law attaches to a partnership as a business form will be investigated as well
as the impact that such attributes may have on the likelihood or relevance of creating a PE for the partners
or partnership in South Africa.
The analysis will further be limited to South African income tax considerations relating to partnerships and
will not extend to other types of taxes, such as Value-Added Tax (hereafter referred to as
income tax treatment of a partnership differs dramatically from the VAT treatment.36
1.6 Structure of dissertation
Whether a PE of a partnership or its partners has been created in South Africa will depend on various
factors that are domestic and international in nature. This paper will focus on some of the attributes of a
partnership that are, , particularly at risk of creating a PE and that should be relevant to
a South African court in seeking to impose taxes on the income of a cross-border partnership or its partners.
The introductory chapter above briefly discussed the relevance of conflict of laws in the context of taxation.
It was determined that a South African court is likely to treat a foreign entity as a partnership if it more
closely resembles the domestic business form of a partnership as opposed to any other South African
business form. The South African domestic law of partnership as developed under the common law was
introduced in 1.2 above and the important conclusion was reached that South Africa levies taxes on
partnership income in the hands of the partners themselves instead of taxing the partnership as a business
at partnership level. This unique income tax treatment mainly flows from the fact that a partnership is not
regarded as a legal person at South African common law, which may not necessarily be the case in a
different jurisdiction. For the benefit of the reader who is reasonably informed of international tax concepts,37
it is noted that whether a partnership is treated as a legal person and/or a taxable entity in a given state
may be relevant, in particular, to whether a DTA should apply in the circumstances38 and in determining the
relevant enterprise in relation to which a PE may potentially be created in terms of the provisions of such
DTA.39
The South African common law recognises several different types of partnerships, which will be elaborated
on in chapter 2 below. This is done in view of determining whether the different types of partnerships have
35 This is reiterated by the OECD Partnership Report at R(15)-
approach as the one they apply in a purely domestic context. They will therefore apply their domestic tax classification to foreign
36 For a discussion of some of the important VAT considerations in the context of partnerships, see Henning (2014:165-166).
37 The meaning of certain technical terms used in this part 1.6 will be explained more fully in the relevant chapters below.
38 See discussion in 5.1 below.
39 See discussion in 5.2 below.
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different legal and fiscal attributes which may impact differently on the creation of a PE for the partnership
or partners in South Africa. In a commercial context it is particularly important to distinguish between
ordinary and extraordinary partners. Extraordinary partners are sometimes referred to as limited or special
partners and, as the name suggests, are not partners in the full sense of the word.40 Another prevalent
category of partnerships will also briefly be looked at, viz universal and particular partnerships. The impact
of legislation on the taxation of partnerships in terms of current South African law will be analysed, in
particular the introduction of s 24H and the definition of a 1 of the Act. For the
reasonably informed reader it is noted
may potentially ,41 which is established in terms of
domestic rules. As discussed in 1.1 above, DTAs do not introduce the right to tax. As a result, the creation
of a PE in terms of a DTA may be irrelevant from the perspective of a country seeking to impose taxes if
that country does not possess the requisite jurisdiction to tax.
The important role that the law of agency plays in the partnership context will be discussed in chapter 3
below. The relevance of the law of agency to the creation of a PE is found in one of the alternative tests
found in the MTCs commonly relied on by South Africa in negotiating DTAs, in terms of which a PE may be
created in certain circumstances by virtue of persons having the authority to conclude contracts in the name
of an enterprise and habitually exercising such authority, notwithstanding the absence of a fixed place of
business.42 The extent to which the law of agency applies specifically in the context of partnerships will
therefore be considered, including the potential application of the undisclosed principal doctrine to
partnerships. The position of ordinary partners as agents of the partnership will be compared to that of
extraordinary partners in order to determine whether extraordinary partners carry the same risk of creating
a PE for the enterprise as their ordinary counterparts.
Chapter 4 will start looking at the taxation of partnerships from an international angle in considering the
rules surrounding the source of partnership income as a basis for imposing taxes, also referred to as
jurisdiction to tax. It is submitted that the possible existence of a PE under the provisions of a DTA should
be irrelevant in circumstances where the particular state does not have the necessary jurisdiction to tax in
terms of its domestic laws as DTAs do not introduce the right to impose taxes. Rules of source as developed
under the South African common law will briefly be considered, with the focus on any special rules relating
to the source of partnership income. The impact that s 24H of the Act may have on the source of partnership
income will also be explored. Ultimately, careful consideration will be given to the relevance of the source
of income in the context of the creation of a PE, so as not to confuse the two concepts.
40 to partners that are
not ordinary partners.
41 See discussion in 4.1 below.
42 See discussion in 5.3 below.
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Chapter 5 will consider the term PE as a means of imposing tax by a country on the profits of a non-resident
enterprise conducting business in that country. The enquiry into the term PE will be focused on the creation
of a PE by way of the activities or presence of a partner or partners in South Africa. The relevant
commentary will be consulted insofar as it may be helpful in determining the risk of creating a PE,
specifically in the context of a cross-border partnership. Due to the relevance of the law of agency to
partners, the alternative test for the creation of a PE where a person acts on behalf of an enterprise who
has and habitually exercises an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise, is of great
importance and will be critically evaluated. In addition, consideration will be given to the situation in which
partners may render services in South Africa, as their contribution to the partnership or otherwise, which
may also give rise to a PE in certain circumstances. Whether the rendering of services by partners in South
Africa may give rise to a PE will be evaluated in light of the recent decision by the Tax Court in in ITC 13276.
Throughout chapter 5, the position of ordinary partners will be tested against that of extraordinary partners
in considering the risk of creating a PE in South Africa.
The concluding chapter 6 will aim to answer the difficult question whether the presence or activities of a
partner or partners in South Africa creates (or is at risk of creating) a PE for that partner, the partnership or
the co-partners in South Africa in light of some of the unique attributes of a partnership.
Substantial research has on previous occasions been conducted on the application of DTAs to
partnerships.43 However, the taxation of cross-border partnerships as hybrid entities remains a complex
matter and further research on the subject is warranted. In particular, the consequences of having created
a PE for the partnership or partners is beyond the scope of this paper. Recommendations for further
research will therefore include to what extent the income of a cross-border partnership should be attributed
to that PE should it be found that a PE has indeed been created.
43 See, for instance, the OECD Partnership Report.
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2. Types of partnerships under South African domestic law
2.1 Introduction
The primary source of partnership law in South Africa is the common law, which is based on Roman and
Roman-Dutch law (Bamford, 1982:x1vii).44 The writings of the French jurist, Pothier, influenced the Roman-
Dutch law of partnership to some extent and the South African courts have in the past viewed Pothier as
an invaluable source of partnership law (Henning, 2014:7) essentialia
of a partnership into South African law in Joubert v Tarry.
The South African law of partnership therefore inherited a number of different ways to classify partnerships
from Roman and Roman-Dutch law. Partnerships can generally be grouped into universal versus particular
partnerships on the one hand and ordinary versus extraordinary partnerships on the other hand (Davis et
al., 2011:326).45
2.2 Universal versus particular partnerships
Partnerships may be classified as either universal or particular. Pothier dates the classification of
partnerships as universal versus particular back to Roman law (1854:23).
It is impractical to formulate a precise definition of the concept of a universal partnership. These types of
partnerships would typically be entered into for an indefinite period of time and extend beyond a specified
project (Davis et al., 2011:326). According to Pothier, Roman law recognised two different types of universal
partnerships, viz the societas universorum bonorum46 and the societas universorum quae ex quaestu
veniunt (1854:23-24). Despite earlier views to the contrary,47 both of these kinds of universal partnerships
have survived in South African partnership law, as was recently accepted by the SCA in Butters v Mncora.
Pothier describes a universorum bonorum as a universal partnership of all property, both present and
1854:24). In Butters v Mncora, the SCA held in a three over two majority that a tacit universal
partnership (specifically the universorum bonorum) was created between two unmarried cohabitees, which
44 Although specific aspects of partnerships are governed by legislation, for example in the areas of insolvency and criminal
proceedings (Bamford 1982:x1vii) and the law of civil procedure in which special rules have been developed for partnerships that are
involved in legal proceedings (Henning, 2014:156-163).
45 Although Roman-Dutch law and ultimately South African law acknowledged other types of partnerships (Henning, 2006:para. 256),
the classifications of universal versus particular and ordinary versus extraordinary seem to be more commercially relevant today than
any other form of classification.
46 Also referred to as the societas omnium bonorum (Henning, 2006:para. 257 fn. 2).
47 De Wet and Yeats discarded the universorum bonorum as a concept only relevant in Roman law, having fallen into misuse in early
Roman-Dutch law (1964:563). Bamford, relying
universorum bonorum) may, save for certain exceptions, in general be unlawful and therefore invalid
(1982:19).
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partnership extended beyond a commercial undertaking. In this case, the plaintiff had shared in the benefits
of the defendant's financial contribution to their common household whereas the defendant had shared in
the benefits of the plaintiff's contribution to the maintenance of their common home and the raising of the
children (although the plaintiff herself made a minor financial contribution to the common household). Heher
for the majority that a universal partnership
had been created based on what Heher JA referred to at 18 para. 44 as he full bench,
however,
Notably, Brand JA declined to recognise any special requirements for the existence of a universal
partnership between cohabitees,48 holding at para. 17 that universal partnerships between cohabitees, like
all partnerships - universal or otherwise, are subject to the general essentialia of a partnership as formulated
by Pothier and accepted into South African partnership law.
Unlike a universal partnership of all property, the universorum quae ex quaestu veniunt is a universal
partnership only in respect of profits made in the pursuit of all forms of commerce or trade (Pothier,
1854:32). The universorum quae ex quaestu veniunt is also referred to as a partnership of general profits
(De Wet & Yeats, 1964:563). As the universorum quae ex quaestu veniunt only relates to profits, this form
of a partnership therefore excludes, for example, any donations or inheritances (Henning, 2006:para. 257).
In Isaacs v Isaacs, 1949 (2) All SA 147 (C), the court acknowledged the following description formulated by
Pothier of a universal partnership of general profits:
The parties thereby contract a partnership of all that they may acquire during its continuance, from
every kind of commerce. They are considered to enter into this kind of partnership when they declare
that they contract together a partnership without any further explanation. 1854:32-33)
Particular partnerships, as opposed to universal partnerships, are usually restricted in terms of duration and
subject matter (Davis et al., 2011:326). The different types of particular partnerships identified by Pothier
include a partnership in relation to specified property, a partnership to exercise a certain art or profession
together and a partnership in commerce or trade (1854:23). In this last category of particular partnerships
concluded for purposes of commerce, a second method of classification, viz ordinary versus extraordinary
partnerships, is particularly relevant.
48 The SCA at para. 15 relied on the treatise of Felicius-Boxelius in recognising that a universal partnership of all property between
cohabitees may be entered into tacitly, but rejected at para. 16 any special requirements for such a partnership as proposed by
Felicius-Boxelius (viz cohabitation, sharing of profits and freedom of accounting to each other). As advocated by Henning, the impact
of the writings of Felicius-Boxelius on Roman-Dutch and ultimately South African partnership law should not be underestimated
(2014:9-14). The
above all others (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:167).
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2.3 Ordinary versus extraordinary partnerships
Partnerships and their partners may furthermore be classified as either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
partners are usually subject to the normal consequences of a partnership agreement,49 whereas
extraordinary partners are usually not treated as partners in the full sense of the word.
According to Pothier, ordinary partners are jointly and severally bound to all creditors for all debts that were
incurred in the name of the partnership by a person who had the authority to contract on behalf of all of the
partners (1854:71). This flows from the ordinary consequences of a partnership that partners manage the
business of the partnership for each other as agents (Pothier, 1854:71).
In common law jurisdictions, partners incur primary liability in respect of all partnerships debts, which
include the contractual and delictual debts of the partnership (Avery Jones et al., 2002:303). This accords
with the position under South African law that ordinary partners can each be held liable for the full amount
of all partnership debts (Henning, 2014:92).50 In Bester v Van Niekerk, the AD noted at 783 as follows:
[O]n dissolution, the enforceable liability of partners is joint and several in the absence of a contrary express
.51
Extraordinary partners, as opposed to ordinary partners, enjoy a certain measure of protection from liability.
De Wet and Yeats describe the common feature of all extraordinary partnerships as having one or more
partners that are only liable as partners to their co-partners and not to the outside world (1964:584). Since
extraordinary partners are not jointly and severally liable to the outside world with their ordinary co-partners,
such limited partners should not hold themselves out as ordinary partners to third parties (De Wet & Yeats,
1964:584-585). Where limited partners hold themselves out as ordinary partners, third parties acting in
good faith may hold them liable as if they were ordinary partners (De Wet & Yeats, 1964:585-586).52
Pothier identified two kinds of extraordinary partnerships, viz anonymous partnerships and partnerships en
commandite, which should be distinguished from ordinary partnerships (1854:70). These two kinds of
49 Ordinary partners would normally obtain the following general rights: to share in common profits, to manage the business of the
partnership and in respect thereof represent the co-partners, to be compensated for incurring partnership expenses and to share in
assets on dissolution; while ordinary partners would normally incur the following general obligations: to make a contribution to the
partnership, to share in common losses, to manage the common interests as if it were their own and to account to their co-partners
on all profits and benefits acquired in the course of carrying on the partnership (De Wet & Yeats, 1964:564-570). Note that this should
not be seen as an exhaustive list and partners may, subject to certain minimum requirements, decide to vary the details of their
particular partnership agreement.
50 During the existence of the partnership, creditors of the partnership are required to enforce their claims against the partnership
assets that are held by the partners in common, which should be distinguished from the private estates of the individual partners (De
Wet & Yeats, 1964:572). It was held in Lee v Maraisdrif (Edms) Bpk, 1976 (2) SA 536 (A) at 58 that each partner in a partnership
could be held liable for the full amount of all partnership debts upon dissolution of the partnership, notwithstanding that the liquidation
of the partnership may not be finalised.
51 Quoted with approval in Lee v Maraisdrif at 58.
52 Even a third party, not being a partner in the partnership, may incur obligations that bind the partners in common if that third party
had actual authority or alternatively ostensible authority to do so (De Wet & Yeats, 1964:574-575). See further chapter 3 below.
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extraordinary partnerships are still recognised in South African common law today (Henning, 2014:92). A
third kind of extraordinary partnership, known as special partnerships, was introduced by way of legislation
in the Cape Province and Natal prior to South Africa becoming a Union (De Wet & Yeats, 1964:584). The
important features of the three different kinds of extraordinary partnerships are described below.
2.3.1 Anonymous partnerships
Anonymous partnerships are partnerships in which the partners have agreed that the business of the
partnership will not be carried on in the name of all of the partners (De Wet & Yeats, 1964:585). The known
partner(s), in whose name the business is carried on, is in practice also referred to as the general partner,
whereas the unknown partner(s) is referred to as the anonymous or silent partner(s). Although their names
should not be disclosed to third parties, anonymous partners do not become liable as if they were ordinary
partners simply because their names and involvement in the partnership have become known, provided
they did not misrepresent themselves as ordinary partners (Henning, 2014:106-107).
An anonymous partner is not liable to third parties for partnership debts, provided he has not
misrepresented himself as an ordinary partner to such third parties (De Wet & Yeats, 1964:585).
Anonymous partners do, however, incur liability towards their co-partners in respect of their share of the
partnership debts as agreed in terms of the partnership agreement (De Wet & Yeats, 1964:585). Unlike the
partner en commandite
contribution to the partnership (Henning, 2014:106).
The court in Sabatelli v St. Andrews Building Society, 1933 WLD 55 confirmed at 57 that, for the duration
of the partnership, an anonymous partner may not interfere or participate in the business or affairs of the
partnership. This indicates another significant deviation from one of the normal consequences of an
ordinary partnership, that anonymous partners, unlike their ordinary co-partners, are in principle not allowed
to manage the business of the partnership as agents.
2.3.2 Partnerships en commandite
A partnership en commandite is very similar to an anonymous partnership. In brief, a partnership en
commandite will not be carried on in the name of the partner en commandite, who will also not be liable to
third parties for partnership debts, provided he has not misrepresented himself as an ordinary partner of
the partnership (Pothier, 1854:43). The distinguishing feature between these two kinds of extraordinary
partnerships is that, whereas anonymous partners incur open-ended liability towards their co-partners albeit
limited to their agreed share of the partnership debts, partners en commandite may only be held liable by
their co-partners up to a maximum of the amount that they contributed to the partnership (Pothier, 1854:43).
19
That the partnership en commandite is similar to an anonymous partnership, apart from the so-called liability
cap as a distinguishing feature, was confirmed in Eaton & Louw v Arcade Properties (Pty) Ltd, 1961 (4) All
SA 182 (T). Partners en commandite are likewise not allowed to manage the business of the partnership
(Henning, 2014:99). The view has been expressed that partners en commandite should be able to manage
the business of the partnership insofar as it relates to their capital contribution, however, this issue has not
yet been settled in a South African court (Henning, 2014:100).
2.3.3 Special partnerships in the Cape Province and Natal
Special or limited partnerships were introduced by way of legislation53 in the Cape Province and Natal prior
to South Africa becoming a Union. Although the legislation that introduced special partnerships has since
been repealed by the Pre-Union Statute Law Revision Act, 36 of 1976, any rights or obligations that may
have accrued in terms of these statutes remain unaffected (Davis et al., 2011:328).
As a validity requirement, special partnerships had to be registered with the Registrar of Deeds (De Wet &
Yeats, 1964:585). Henning notes that special partnerships are similar to the common law partnership en
commandite (2015:251).54 Special partners are therefore only liable towards their co-partners and their
liability is limited to the amount contributed to the partnership. Special partners, like their common law
equivalents, were not allowed to hold themselves out as partners to third parties and their names could not
appear in the name of the partnership or business, failing which they could lose their protection from liability
towards third parties in respect of partnership debts (De Wet & Yeats, 1964:585). Only the general partners
could act on behalf of the special partnership (Henning, 2015:270). Save for advising the general partners,
special partners were not allowed to partake in the management or business of the partnership (Henning,
2014:109).
2.4 as a South African fiscal term
A as defined in s 1 of the Act is not a distinct kind of partnership in the same sense as
the types of partnerships that have developed in the South African common law as discussed in 2.2 and
2.3 above. Rather it is a South African fiscal term that was introduced into the Act by way of the Taxation
Laws Amendment Act, 7 of 2010 (hereafter referred to as , specifically to assist in
classifying bodies of persons that were formed outside South Africa that contain some of the same
characteristics as a partnership as understood under South African domestic law.
53 The Cape Special Partnerships Limited Liability Act, 24 of 1861 and the Natal Special Partnerships Limited Liability Act, 1864.
54 The availability of the (similar but less formalistic) common law partnership en commandite to investors is likely the main reason
why the special partnership was never well received as a separate type of partnership in South Africa (Henning, 2015:274).
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The definition was introduced primarily to align the South African tax treatment of
partnerships that were formed outside South Africa and might otherwise have constituted hybrid entities,
with the tax treatment of the country of formation (Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws
Amendment Bill, 2010:86).
In short, any partnership, association, body of persons or entity that was formed or established under the
laws of any
is treated as tax transparent in its country of formation (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:172). For purposes of the
definition , a foreign body will be regarded as tax transparent in its country of
formation if the receipts and accruals of that foreign body are subject to income tax in the hands of each
member when amounts are received by or accrue to the foreign body and the foreign body itself is not liable
for or subject to income tax (other than municipal, local or comparable taxes).55 Where the country of
formation does not have any income tax laws, the foreign body will be regarded as tax transparent if all
amounts that are received by or accrue to the foreign body or expenditure incurred by that foreign body are
allocated concurrently with the receipt, accrual or incurral to the members in their relevant proportions.56
as defined in the Act is expressly excluded from the definitions of a and
in terms of s 1 of the Act. Foreign partnerships as defined are therefore not regarded as taxable
entities or taxpayers in South Africa. The result is that a partnership which is treated as fiscally transparent
under the laws of a foreign country where it was established will likewise be treated as fiscally transparent
for purposes of the Act. A fiscally transparent foreign partnership will not attract tax at entity level in South
Africa; rather the partners may potentially be subject to tax on their share of the partnership income if South
Africa has jurisdiction to tax that income in the hands of those partners. On the other hand, if a foreign
partnership is not treated as fiscally transparent in its country of formation, it should likewise not be treated
as fiscally transparent for purposes of the Act (Davis Tax Committee [DTC], 2014:29-30).
A body of persons which is not treated as fiscally transparent in its country of formation does not constitute
a as defined and will likely fall into the
at para.
the Republic or any body corporate form
defined is regarded as 57 in terms of the Act. A body of persons that qualifies as a and
55 In terms of para. (a) of the definition.
56 In terms of para. (b) of the definition. Note that para. (a) will usually determine whether an entity should be regarded as a
vying taxes on income
(De Koker & Williams, 2016:para. 11.12A).
57 he Act is
phrased as including only four cases that may otherwise have been subject to uncertainty based on the ordinary meaning of the word
applies to
the interpretation of any law unless the p including, amongst
in
paras. (b) and (c) of that definition. All companies and bodies of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated, therefore qualify
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therefore a in terms of the Act is regarded as a taxpayer and income of that body may potentially
be subject to tax at entity level if South Africa has jurisdiction to tax that income in the hands of that body.58
This alignment of the tax treatment in South Africa with the foreign jurisdiction of formation serves to reduce
the incidences of hybrid entities in accordance with the stated purpose of the 2010 TLAA. The insertion of
a definition of a foreign partnership in the Act is also in line with the
approach mentioned by Avery Jones et al. (2002:289), while the definition focusses on the crucial attribute
of fiscal transparency (or not) in determining whether a body of persons that was formed outside South
Africa should be taxed as a partnership in South Africa (or not).
2.5 The impact of s 24H on limited partners
Section 24H(1) ny member of a partnership en
commandite, an anonymous partnership
liability towards a creditor of the partnership is limited to the amount which the member has contributed or
undertaken to contribute to the partnership or is in any other way limited . A limited partner as defined will
therefore include any extraordinary partner that may be involved in the three kinds of extraordinary
partnerships known in the South African law of partnership.59 The definition of a limited partner will also
extend to a partner in a foreign partnership (as defined in s 1) if the liability of that partner towards creditors
of the foreign partnership is limited in any way.
Section 24H(3) of the Act prohibits limited partners from claiming deductions or allowances in respect of
the trade or business of a partnership that in aggregate exceed the sum of the amount for which that partner
may be held liable by creditors of the partnership60 plus any income received by or accrued to that partner
from the trade or business of the partnership. Allowances or deductions that have been disallowed in terms
of s 24H(3) may be carried forward by the limited partners to the succeeding year of assessment in terms
of s 24H(4), subject to the same limitation each year. As a result, limited partners are unable to carry forward
assessed losses in relation to their partnership income (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:176).
fined in the
Act, in which case it
58 Further complexities arise as to how distributions to members should be taxed, which fall beyond the scope of this paper.
59 Extraordinary partnerships include anonymous partnerships and partnerships en commandite under the common law as well as
special partnerships that were created by statute in the Cape Province and Natal.
60 Based on the practical approach suggested by Meyerowitz (1996:16-30 §16.79) and as illustrated in the example by Clegg and
s in an
a partnership en commandite or a special partnership
created by statute in the Cape Province or Natal. However, creditors of the partnership may usually not hold limited partners liable at
all, since limited partners only incur liability towards their co-partners and not towards outside creditors (Henning, 2014:93). The
wording of this provision is therefore problematic as it seems to be based on the misconception that creditors of the partnership can
directly hold limited partners liable to some degree.
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Section 24H(2) of the Act deems every partner who carries on trade or business in a partnership to be
carrying on such trade or business of the partnership, notwithstanding that such partner may be a limited
partner. This constitutes a significant deviation from the original position in the South African law of
partnership that extraordinary partners are generally not allowed to interfere or participate in the business
or affairs of the partnership. The use of the 24H(2) has the effect of extending
the application of the deeming provision to all partners, whether they are ordinary or limited partners.
However, the deeming provision was introduced specifically to assist limited partners, who will often have
difficulties showing that they are indeed carrying on the business or trade of the partnership:
In view of the fact that a limited partner may not disclose to outsiders the fact that he is a partner, and may
not take part in the running of the partnership business, there is at present some doubt whether such a partner
can himself be said to be carrying on the business of the partnership. Subsection (2) has accordingly been
introduced to make it clear that such a partner [referring to a limited partner] will be deemed to be carrying on
the trade or business of the partnership. (Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Amendment Bill,
1988:22)
In Grundlingh v CSARS, 2009 ZAFSHC 99, 72 SATC 1, the Full Bench of the Free State High Court applied
s 24H(2) of the Act in the context of a cross-border partnership. In this case the taxpayer was a South
African resident who practiced as an attorney in a partnership formed in Lesotho. The partnership
business activities were confined to Lesotho, where its fixed place of business and office were located.
Relying on s 24H(2), the court held at 10 para. 10.8 that the taxpayer was deemed to carry on the business
of the partnership and therefore that ived from the partnership was deemed
to have been generated by the taxpayer due to the fact that he was a partner in the partnership.
The judgment in Grundlingh was handed down before the introduction of the definition of a foreign
partnership in the Act. Had Grundlingh been decided today, the partnership in question would have
constituted a foreign partnership as defined since the partnership was treated as fiscally transparent in
terms of the laws of Lesotho as well as South Africa. The deeming provision in s 24H(2) states that it applies
to partnerships but is silent as to whether it applies to foreign partnerships. This omission is peculiar since
both ss 24H(1) and 24H(5) were amended with the introduction of the term foreign partnership in 2010 to
specifically extend the application of those provisions to foreign partnerships. The stated purpose of s
24H(2) is to deem limited partners to be carrying on the business of the partnership. It is therefore submitted
that the deeming provision in s 24H(2) should at least apply to limited partners of a foreign partnership.
There also appears to be no reason why the application of s 24H(2) cannot be extended to ordinary partners
has not been limited in any way.
It is preferable that it be expressly clarified in s 24H(2) whether it should apply to partners of a foreign
partnership.
The deeming provision contained in s 24H(2) is undoubtedly an important provision in determining the
South African domestic tax consequences for limited partners in domestic and possibly foreign
23
partnerships. It is, however, questionable whether this domestic provision may be relied on at all for
purposes of interpreting the provisions of a DTA to determine whether a PE has been created (Olivier &
Honiball, 2011:188), as will be further explored in chapter 5 below.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter 2 identified the major distinctions that may be drawn between different kinds of partnership in
terms of current South African law. The great weight afforded by the South African courts to the writings of
Pothier was once again illustrated when the SCA declined to recognise any special requirements for the
existence of a universal partnership essentialia should remain the
threshold for the creation of any kind of partnership in South Africa.
Traditionally a distinction will be drawn between universal versus particular partnerships on the one hand
and ordinary versus extraordinary partnerships on the other hand. Universal partnerships can further be
divided into universal partnerships of all property and universal partnerships of general profits. Universal
partnerships should not be ignored as these kinds of partnerships still feature in the South African
partnership law of today, however, usually in a family context such as cohabitation. In commercial
undertakings and especially in cross-border situations, particular partnerships would likely be more
prevalent than universal partnerships. Particular partnerships, specifically particular partnerships in
commerce or trade, will likely be the preferred partnership category for use in cross-border commercial
undertakings. Particular partnerships in commerce may further be classified as either ordinary or
extraordinary partnerships, which is a crucial distinction in determining the consequences for the
partnership and its partners.
The categories of extraordinary partnerships in South African partnership law include anonymous
partnerships and partnerships en commandite under the common law as well as special partnerships that
were created by a (now repealed) statute in the Cape Province and Natal. A common characteristic that
distinguishes extraordinary partners from ordinary partners is that extraordinary partners do not incur
liability towards outside creditors of the partnership for partnership debts as they only incur liability towards
their co-partners. Whereas anonymous partners may be held liable by their co-partners up to their agreed
share of the partnership debts, the liability of partners en commandite towards their co-partners is limited
to their capital contribution. As a result, extraordinary partners are as a rule not allowed to hold themselves
out as partners to the outside world and furthermore may not interfere in the business of the partnership.
into the Act to align the South African tax treatment of cross-
border partnerships with the tax treatment in its country of formation. Partnerships, associations, bodies of
persons or entities that were formed under the laws of a country other than South Africa are regarded as
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foreign partnerships as defined if they are treated as tax transparent in their country of formation. The South
African fiscus will not seek to impose taxes on a fiscally transparent foreign partnership at partnership level
but may tax the partners on their respective shares of the partnership income, provided South Africa has
jurisdiction to tax that income in the hands of those partners. Conversely, the South African fiscus may seek
to impose taxes at entity level on a cross-border partnership that is not fiscally transparent in its country of
formation, provided South Africa has jurisdiction to tax that income in the hands of that partnership.
The position of limited partners (including anonymous partners and partners en commandite whose liability
towards creditors are limited in some way) has been altered for income tax purposes by s 24H of the Act,
which applies to the taxation of partnerships and foreign partnerships as defined. The significant deviations
from the original position under South African partnership law include that limited partners are prohibited
from claiming deductions or allowances in excess of their exposure to creditors of the partnership plus their
share of the partnership profits61 and furthermore that all partners are now deemed to be carrying on the
business or trade of the partnership.62
Whereas ordinary partners are generally allowed to manage the business of the partnership for each other,
extraordinary partners are now also deemed to be carrying on the business of the partnership in terms of
the Act. The next chapter will consider the power of representation amongst partners in more detail, with
particular focus on the difference between ordinary and extraordinary partners in this regard.
61 In terms of s 24H(3).
62 In terms of s 24H(2).
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3. Partners as agents of the partnership or each other
3.1 Introduction to the South African law of agency
Representation or agency plays an important role in any partnership. In the context of particular
partnerships concluded for purposes of commerce, Pothier notes that ordinary partnerships are entered
into for the purpose of carrying on a business in the name of all the partners
person
in, as well in his own name as in the name of his co-partners,
1854:39-40)
The principles of the South African law of agency derive from Roman-Dutch law, in terms of which direct
representation was eventually recognised in spite of the earlier Roman law rule against contracting by
representation (De Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:95). In general, the law of agency applies where one person (the
agent) performs a juristic act on behalf of another person (the principal) with the intention that the legal
consequences of that act should attach to the principal and not the agent (De Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:96).63
Where an agent concludes a bilateral juristic act on behalf of another person, such as entering into a
contract with a third party, the agent and the third party must agree that the contract will only give rise to
rights and obligations for the third party and the principal (not the agent) (De Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:96). In
establishing whether consensus was reached between the contracting parties, regard must be had to the
intention of the agent and not that of the principal (De Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:98). The third party must be
aware that the agent is contracting on behalf of a principal (even if the name of the principal is initially kept
secret), as the third party will be entering into a legal relationship with that principal (Van der Merwe et al.,
2007:254). This speaks to intention as a key requirement of the law of contract. It can be said that the agent
and the third party are the parties to the contract, although the principal and the third party become the
parties to the legal relationship flowing from that contract (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:252).
Persons who enter into contracts as agents on behalf of others must have the proper authority or power of
attorney to do so (De Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:110). Granting authority is a unilateral act which need not
necessarily be formally accepted in terms of an agreement (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:256). Actual
authority (as opposed to ostensible authority) is usually granted by way of a contract of mandate in terms
of which one person agrees to carry out the instruction of another person, which may also include (either
63 Also referred to as direct representation since the rights and obligations accrue to the principal in a direct manner (Van der Merwe
et al., 2007:255). Representation in terms of the South African law of agency goes beyond simply being a messenger or translator for
benefit
of another, as these situations do not involve a person performing an act on behalf of another person as a result of which rights and
obligations directly accrue to that other person (De Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:97).
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expressly or tacitly by implication) the authority to conclude such an act on behalf of the other person (Van
der Merwe et al., 2007:253).
Where a person purportedly concludes a contract with a third party on behalf of a principal without the
necessary authority to do so, no legal relationship is created between the principal and the third party (De
Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:114). The principal may, however, ratify the juristic act after it has been concluded
by accepting the acts of the agent, either expressly or tacitly via conduct (De Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:114).
Where a contract is ratified within a reasonable time, the agent is regarded as having had the proper
authority to contract on behalf of the principal from the beginning (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:257). A
person may also be held liable for acts concluded by a purported agent who did not have actual authority
if that person (the principal) is guilty of creating the reasonable impression that the purported agent had the
necessary authority to act on behalf of the principal in accordance with estoppel by representation, also
referred to as ostensible authority (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:256-257).64
The principles of the law of agency should not be confused with the doctrine of the undisclosed principal.65
This doctrine developed in English law, from where it was accepted into South African law (Van der Merwe
et al., 2007:263).66 It should therefore not be seen as a component or extension of the law of agency as the
two disciplines developed separately and originated from different legal systems. The doctrine applies
where a person (the agent) enters into an agreement in his own name with a third party but under the
instruction of an undisclosed principal to whom the agent is required to cede all rights under the contract
(Van der Merwe et al., 2007:263). The agent does not necessarily have the authority to contract on behalf
of the undisclosed principal but must have acted on the instruction of the undisclosed principal (De Wet &
Van Wyk, 1992:125). The relationship therefore resembles an indirect form of representation. Provided the
agent acted in accordance with his mandate, either the undisclosed principal or the third party (once the
third party becomes aware of such principal) may choose that the undisclosed principal instead of the agent
should become the party to the legal relationship flowing from the contract (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:263-
264). This results in the strange outcome that a person may be held liable in terms of a contract to which
that person was not a party, despite not having granted the necessary authority (Van der Merwe et al.,
2007:264). The undisclosed principal is treated as having taken cession of the rights even though no
cession had actually taken place (De Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:126). The outcome of successfully relying on
the doctrine of the undisclosed principal is in a sense the same as direct representation, in that the principal
and the third party are in the end bound by the legal relationship flowing from the contract entered into by
the so-called agent and the third party.
64 The recent case of Bester NO v Schmidt Bou Ontwikkelings CC (2016) JOL 35314 (SCA) confirmed at 10 para. 17 that the doctrine
of estoppel, as accepted from English law into the South African common law, means that
words or conduct made a representation to another (the representee) and the latter acted upon the representation to his or her
65 The two subjects are often confused, especially where direct representation occurs albeit on behalf of a principal whose identity has
not been disclosed (De Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:125).
66 De Wet and Van Wyk question whether the doctrine should have been accepted into South African law in the first place (1992:124).
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The basic principles of representation in terms of the South African law of agency (including, for ease of
reference, the doctrine of the undisclosed principal) have been set out above. The relevance of these
principles to South African partnerships will be discussed below. The focus of this paper is on the
considerations that a South African court should take into account when considering the taxation of a cross-
border partnership and therefore the South African position is investigated. However, a South African court
may be required in terms of the rules of private international law to apply a foreign law in determining
whether a particular partner in a cross-border partnership may in fact have acted with the necessary
authority on behalf of the partnership or its partners.67 It is submitted that the granting of authority to an
agent is a relationship emanating from private law, in which case, as noted by Vogel, the rules of private
international law remain relevant albeit in the context of taxation (1986:13).
There are significant differences between the law of agency in common and civil law jurisdictions, which
impact on the application of the principles of agency to partnerships in those jurisdictions (Avery Jones et
al., 2002:294).68 As a general rule, common law jurisdictions only recognise one contract, whether such
contract is brought about by an agent with the necessary authority acting on behalf of a principal or by the
application of the doctrine of the undisclosed principal (Avery Jones et al., 2002:294), as is also the case
under South African law.
3.2 Authorisation (including mutual mandate) amongst partners
It is generally accepted that the so- a naturalia, ie a term which
flows automatically from any partnership agreement (De Wet & Yeats, 1964:560).69 Once a valid
essentialia, the naturalia of a
partnership agreement (including mutual mandate) will apply by implication. The naturalia of any contract
may be varied expressly or tacitly by agreement between the parties (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:284). It
follows that the mutual mandate amongst the partners may be varied by agreement inter se, although such
variation would not bind bona fide third parties who are unaware of the arrangement (De Wet & Yeats,
1964:560).
In Potchefstroom Dairies, the Transvaal Provincial Division confirmed that the general principles of the law
of agency apply to partners as a natural consequence of any partnership agreement, stating at 511 that:
are very often styled agents of each other. Whether they are actually agents or not (the law of
agency as we understand it was developed much later than the law of partnership), they certainly have the
67 In commercial contracts involving foreign elements, it is not uncommon for parties to include choice of jurisdiction and choice of law
clauses whereby they agree which forum should adjudicate any dispute arising from the contract and in terms of which law. Parties
choosing a South African court as the appropriate forum are likely to also choose South African law as the appropriate law.
68 A comparative analysis of the law of agency goes beyond the scope of this paper.
69 Van den Heever even elevated the mutual mandate to an additional essentialia for the conclusion of any partnership agreement,
however, this view was rightly rejected by De Wet and Yeats in favour of it constituting a naturalia (1964:560).
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powers of agents, and the broad principles of the law which are applicable to agents apply to this extent to
partners.
It is a requirement of the law of agency that agents may only act on behalf of principals that exist at the time
that the agent acts (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:253). In the context of partnerships, which are not regarded
as legal entities under South African law, the partnership itself cannot be regarded as a principal in a
relationship of agency as the partnership does not exist in law.70 In accordance with the aggregate
approach, the partners themselves are the legal entities rather than the partnership. In considering the
relevance of the law of agency in the context of partnerships, partners may therefore only be considered to
act as representatives of each other but not of the partnership.71 In this sense, every partner may be
regarded as a principal as well as an agent acting on behalf of the co-partners. In Potchefstroom Dairies it
Persons must be duly authorised before they may enter into agreements on behalf of others as their agents.
Partners must likewise have the proper authority before they may conclude juristic acts that bind their co-
partners (Henning, 2014:174).72 Partners may actively grant actual authority to any person (including one
of the partners or a third party) to perform specified acts or even manage the general business operations
of the partnership, which may expand the ordinary business of the partnership if such authority is granted
expressly by all the partners (Henning, 2014:175). Acts concluded by a partner in the name of the partners
in common without the necessary authority, should not give rise to legal obligations binding the co-partners
but may also be ratified by the co-partners after the fact, whether expressly or tacitly via the conduct of the
partners (Henning, 2014:175-176). These principles are in accordance with the principles of direct
representation in terms of the law of agency.
Unique to the partnership as a business form is the mutual mandate that exists between the partners as a
naturalia of any partnership agreement. This flows automatically from one of the ordinary consequences of
a partnership that partners are usually allowed to manage the business of the partnership for each other as
agents (Pothier, 1854:71). Mutual mandate in effect means that every partner has, by virtue of the
partnership agreement, implied actual authority (as opposed to ostensible authority) to conclude contracts
in the name of the partners in common (Henning, 2014:176). Partners need therefore not actively grant
authority to one another for purposes of managing the business of the partnership (the extent of which is a
70 It is regarded as a prerequisite that a partnership must have existed (or must have been held out to exist) before a partner is able
to perform an act that binds the partners in common (Bamford, 1982:51). What is likely envisaged by this requirement is that the
partnership agreement must have been validly concluded before a partner may, by virtue of the partnership agreement, start
performing acts that bind the partners in common.
71 In common law jurisdictions, partners are usually regarded as agents of their co-partners (Avery Jones et al., 2002:296), as is also
the case under South African law.
72 Henning, with respect, loosely refers to binding the partnership (2014:174-175) (as opposed to the co-partners), which is not possible
under South African law as the partnership must exist as a legal entity before it may be bound as a principal to an agreement.
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factual enquiry),73 although the partners may by agreement amongst them vary the extent of the implied
authority granted to the individual partners (Henning, 2014:176-177). A bona fide third party who is unaware
of the variation will not be bound by the agreement amongst the partners inter se to vary the extent of a
(Henning, 2014:179). The other partners may therefore be estopped from denying the misrepresentation
created in the minds of bona fide third parties (viz that every partner has implied authority to manage the
business of the partnership), without such third party having to prove the strict requirements of estoppel
when dealing with a partnership (Henning, 2014:180). Bona fide third parties may also rely on the so-called
Turquand rule74 by assuming that a partner contracting on behalf of the partners in common had complied
with all the internal requirements of the partnership agreement necessary to conclude such a contract
(Henning, 2014:181).
Debts only bind the partners in common if the relevant partner who concluded the contract has, in addition
to having had the necessary authority, concluded the contract in the name of the partnership (Pothier,
1854:71). Contracts that are not concluded in the name of the partnership but only in the name of the
relevant partner do not bind the partners in common (Pothier, 1854:75) and cannot be ratified after the fact.
This requirement speaks to the intention of the contracting parties. Regardless of the actual words used,
the partners will be bound in common if it was the intention of the relevant partner and the third party that
the contract should bind the partners in common, whereas the contract will only bind the relevant partner if
it was the intention of that partner and the third party that it should not bind the partners in common
(Henning, 2014:182-183).
Whereas the principles of the law of agency clearly find application in the partnership context, there is sti ll
some uncertainty as to whether the doctrine of the undisclosed principal should be extended to the
partnership context (Henning, 2014:184). In Eaton & Louw v Arcade Properties, the Transvaal Provincial
Division, with respect, erroneously viewed the doctrine of the undisclosed principal as an extension of the
principles of the law of agency as applicable amongst partners.75 A clear distinction should be drawn
between direct representation and the doctrine of the undisclosed principal. While it is a crucial requirement
of the law of agency (as derived from Roman-Dutch law) that the agent must have had the necessary
(actual) authority to act on behalf of the principal, the doctrine of the undisclosed principal (as inherited from
English law) does not require (actual) authority to have been granted.
73 For examples of cases where partners have been held to have acted within the limits of mutual mandate and conversely where
partners have been held to have exceeded their implied authority, see Henning (2014:177-178). This is purely a factual enquiry and
is impacted by the particular business of the partnership.
74 Named after the English case of Royal British Bank v Turquand, [1843-1860] All ER 435 that was accepted into South African law
in order to protect bona fide third parties transacting with representatives of corporate entities. See, for example, The Mine Workers'
Union v Prinsloo, (1948) 3 All SA 530 (A).
75 half of
an undisclosed principal, namely that the undisclosed principal when discovered is liable to be sued on such a contract, is applicable
where a partner acts on behalf of a partnership even though the existence of the partnership (and therefore of the other partners) is
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3.3 Representation in the context of extraordinary partners
Extraordinary partners are often referred to Henning, 2015:252). This is indicative
of the fact that one of the ordinary consequences of entering into a partnership does not apply to
extraordinary partners as they are generally not allowed to interfere in the business of the partnership, as
was confirmed by the court in Sabatelli at 57. Avery Jones et al. note that, both in common law and civil
law jurisdictions (which often differ vastly on partnership law issues), limited partnerships usually afford
limited liability to the limited partners provided the limited partners are not involved in the management of
the partnership business (2002:292).
In Eaton & Louw v Arcade Properties the court held at 190 that (ordinary) partners in extraordinary
partnerships do not have actual authority to bind the extraordinary partners. There is also no question of
ostensible authority or estoppel provided the extraordinary partners have not held themselves out as
partners. The court again seemed to extend the principles of the law of agency to the doctrine of the
undisclosed principal in holding at 190 that this doctrine should not apply for purposes of binding an
extraordinary partner as a so-called undisclosed principal.
Absent misrepresentation on their part, extraordinary partners are therefore not regarded as the agents of
their co-partners. Furthermore, although partners usually have implied authority to contract on behalf of
their co-partners in running the business of the partnership, such implied authority does not extend to
contracting on behalf of extraordinary partners whose names and involvement in the partnership business
must generally be kept secret.
3.4 Conclusion
South African law regards ordinary partners as agents in relation to the management of the
partnership business. The unique legal nature of a partnership has the result that, in the same transaction,
a partner may be regarded as an agent acting on behalf of the co-partners and a principal in own right.
The principles of the law of agency are often transplanted to the partnership context. An understanding of
the basic rules contained in the law of agency is required to understand how partners may enter into
contracts on behalf of their co-partners. It follows from the law of agency that an individual partner
contracting on behalf of the partners in common must be duly authorised to do so and must furthermore
contract in the name of the partnership. This is an application of direct representation, as the rights and
duties directly bind the partners in common (as opposed to only the individual partner who concluded the
contract).
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Actual authority may be granted expressly or tacitly, whether to a partner or any other person. Authority
may also arise ex lege by implication. Unique in the partnership context is the mutual mandate which arises
automatically by virtue of any partnership agreement. Unless otherwise agreed, every ordinary partner has
the implied authority to conclude acts falling within the ambit of the particular business of the partnership.
The implied authority may be varied by agreement amongst the partners inter se, although such variation
will not bind bona fide third parties who are unaware of the arrangement.
A distinction should be drawn between actual and ostensible authority. Ostensible authority is not granted
as such. A principal (including the partners in common) may be held liable on the basis of ostensible
authority in that the principal is estopped from denying the misrepresentation that was created towards
bona fide third parties. The doctrine of estoppel does not operate on the basis of authority but rather holds
a principal to the misrepresentation of authority.
Estoppel by representation or ostensible authority should furthermore be distinguished from ratification.
Ratification can be done expressly or by implication. If an action is ratified, it appears that authority is almost
granted retrospectively based on the principal acceptance of the act. The outcome of ratification and
estoppel by representation may be similar in that the principal becomes bound to the contract after
conclusion, however, a ratified contract is treated as having been authorised from the beginning whereas
estoppel simply provides a defence for bona fide third parties in certain circumstances notwithstanding that
authority was never granted.
It has been said that the doctrine of the undisclosed principal may apply to partnerships albeit not in relation
to extraordinary partners. Where an individual partner had not contracted in the name of the partners in
common but under their instruction, either the partners in common or the third party may elect that the
undisclosed principal should become bound to the legal relationship flowing from that contract. This doctrine
developed separately from the law of agency. An important distinction between the doctrine of the
undisclosed principal and direct representation in terms of the law of agency is that a so-called agent acting
on the instruction of an undisclosed principal will not contract in the name of the undisclosed principal and
need therefore not necessarily have had the authority to do so, whereas direct representation presupposes
authority to act in the name of the principal. The doctrine of the undisclosed principal is often confused with
the ordinary principles of direct representation as the outcome of applying the two disciplines may be similar
in that the principal is bound by the legal relationship flowing from one contract concluded by the agent.
The position of extraordinary partners is very different to that of ordinary partners, unless the extraordinary
partners have held themselves out to be ordinary partners (thus resulting in an application of ostensible
authority). When ordinary partners act on the strength of mutual mandate, their actions do not bind
extraordinary partners who are, as a rule, not liable to outside creditors. Furthermore, extraordinary partners
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are not allowed to manage the business of the partnership and their actions are therefore not covered by
the usual implied authority of ordinary partners. There is also support for the view that the doctrine of the
undisclosed principal should not be extended to extraordinary partners although, with respect, this seems
to have been on the misapprehension that this doctrine is an extension of the principles of representation
in terms of the law of agency.
It is clear that ordinary partners may bind the partners in common by performing acts relating to the
partnership, even in the absence of express authority being granted to such partners. In the next chapter,
the focus will shift to the relevance of the place where partners perform their duties in the taxation of cross-
border partnerships.
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4. Sources of partnership income
4.1 Source as a means of establishing jurisdiction to tax
Countries impose taxes in accordance with their domestic tax rules, which flows from the fact that most
countries have national sovereignty (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:1). However, a particular country may only
levy taxes if , which requires an appropriate link between the state
concerned and the income which it seeks to tax (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:11). Importantly, this link76 is
determined under the domestic law of the state concerned. South Africa levies taxes on income based on
the tax residence of the taxpayer or the source of the income.77 It should therefore be considered whether
South Africa has jurisdiction to tax based on the domestic concepts of tax residence or source of income
for purposes of establishing the necessary link with South Africa, before relief from double taxation can be
sought in terms of any applicable DTA.
For domestic law purposes, the term 1 of the Act as including natural persons who
are ordinarily resident in South Africa or physically present in South Africa for prescribed periods of time,
or persons other than natural persons which are incorporated, established or formed in South Africa or
which have their place of effective management in South Africa, excluding natural or non-natural persons
who are deemed to be exclusively a resident of another country in terms of any DTA entered into between
South Africa and that other country.78 South Africa imposes taxes on all the income received by or accrued
to its residents on a worldwide basis, while persons who are not South African residents for tax purposes
are required to pay taxes in South Africa on all income received by or accrued to them from a source in
South Africa.79
South African domestic partnerships not subject to income tax
in South Africa at entity level. As a result, South Africa may tax the income of the partnership in the hands
of the partners on a flow-through basis, provided South Africa has jurisdiction to tax based on the residence
of the partners or the source of the income in the hands of those partners (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:168).
Section 24H(5)(a) of the Act [s] deems the
relevant share of the partnership income to have been received by or accrued to each partner on the date
76 nexus Olivier and Honiball (2011:9). This terminology is also used in the
international tax arena by Vogel and Rust,
as residency, or an attribute of the transaction, such as location of property) is needed with the state seeking to impose taxes before
the provisions of the relevant DTA may be invoked (Vogel & Rust, 2015:31). DTAs do not introduce the right to tax but may in certain
-29). It is therefore premature to consult the provisions
of a particular DTA before first considering whether the particular country has jurisdiction to tax the income under consideration.
77 A few countries still impose taxes on the basis of citizenship or domicile (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:46-48). Habitual abode or situs of
assets may also give rise to the imposition of taxes (Vogel, 1986:7).
78 So- -
of a person that may be regarded as a resident of both Contracting States in terms of a particular DTA.
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which such income was received by or accrued to the partners in common. The partnership profits, together
with any other income received by or accrued to the individual partners, will therefore be taxed in their
hands while taking account of individual attributes for purposes of taxation.80
Where the individual partners are not South African residents for income tax purposes but have a presence
or are involved in activities in South Africa, South Africa will need to demonstrate source jurisdiction in order
to impose taxes on the partnership income in the hands of those partners. It is submitted that, in the absence
of residence or source jurisdiction under South African domestic rules, South Africa cannot without more
rely on the provisions of a DTA to impose taxes by, for instance, claiming the existence of a PE in terms of
that DTA. In the absence of jurisdiction to tax, the existence or otherwise or a PE in terms of a DTA should
therefore be irrelevant from the perspective of a state seeking to impose taxes.
The source of income is a domestic law concept (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:10). Source rules will therefore
invariably differ between countries. There is no definition of source in the Act. In the seminal case of CIR V
Lever Brothers & Unilever Ltd, 1946 AD 441, 14 SATC 1, Watermeyer CJ held at 8-9 as to the meaning of
source:
of their being received as income and that this originating cause is the work which the taxpayer does to earn
them, the quid pro quo
At common law, the source of income is therefore determined by looking at of that
income and where that originating cause is located (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:12). The court in Lever Bros
found support in the case of Millin v CIR, (1928) A.D. 207, 3 SATC 170, where the AD held at 174-175 that
the source of royalties which a novelist received from her publishers in the United Kingdom was located in
her novels. It follows that
the source of income originating from services rendered is usually regarded as the place where those
services are rendered (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:15).81
All partners are required to make a contribution to the partnership in terms of the essentialia of any
partnership agreement. In what may currently be regarded as the leading authority on the subject of the
source of partnership income, the AD in CIR v Epstein, 1954 (3) SA 689 (A), 19 SATC 221 determined the
source of partnership income in the hands of an individual partner by focusing on the place where that
partner performed his duties in terms of the partnership agreement. Following the judgment in Epstein,
legislative provisions were introduced into the Act by way of ss 9 and 24H, which deal with the source of
80 For example, income derived by partners which are companies or close corporations will be subject to tax at the corporate income
tax rate applicable to companies whereas income derived by partners who are natural persons will be subject to tax at the rates and
rebate(s) (depending on their age) applicable to natural persons.
81 See, for example, CIR v Nell, (1961) 3 All SA 526 (A).
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income and persons carrying on trade in partnership respectively. The impact, if any, of these provisions
on the common law rules of the source of partnership income will be considered below.
4.2 The source of partnership income
In Epstein, the AD considered the source of partnership income derived by a partner who was resident in
South Africa, where he also performed his duties as a partner of a partnership, which partnership carried
on business in Argentina.
The business of the partnership entailed selling asbestos to customers of the partnership in Argentina.
Once the partnership had solicited an order for asbestos, contribution to the partnership
consisted of procuring such asbestos from the producer in South Africa and arranging for the shipment of
the asbestos directly to the customer in Argentina.82 Although the business of the partnership was the
with the partnership were confined to
South Africa.
Centlivres CJ, writing for the majority (Schreiner JA dissenting), relied on Lever Bros and Millin and held at
223 that the source of s share of the partnership income was located where Mr Epstein himself
carried on his business activities on behalf of the partnership.
South Africa, the source of his partnership income was held to be located in South Africa. The domestic
rule on partnership income
located where that partner carries on business activities on behalf of the partnership.83 With respect, this
fragmented approach seems to ignore the characteristics of the partnership as a business form. The profits
of a partnership first accrue to the partners in common, before it is distributed to the different partners in
accordance with their profit share in terms of the partnership agreement.84 Moreover, the partners do not
receive their share of the partnership profit by virtue of their own activities but rather by virtue of the business
activities of the partnership as a whole, from which they derive their respective profit shares.
Schreiner JA, dissenting, emphasised that a partnership is a business and found at 234 that the source of
of the partnership are realised.85 On the facts
Schreiner JA held at 237 that the business profits were realised where the goods were sold ie Argentina.
Schreiner JA remarked at 234 that apportionment may be required in the appropriate circumstances.
82 See Epstein at 227-228 for details of the partnership agreement.
83 Centlivres CJ made the obiter statement at 233 that the source of partnership income may be located in two different countries if
two partners are carrying on their business activities relating to the partnership in two different countries.
84 Section 24H(5)(a) now deems those two events to occur simultaneously.
85 actions in both countries were the transactions of both partners and the income which
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In CIR v Black, 1957 (3) SA 536(A), 21 SATC 226, Schreiner ACJ, then writing for the majority, held at 235
that the dominant source of the income (which he derived from carrying on the business of a
stockbroker in partnership with two other persons) was located where his capital was employed, ie the
London Stock Exchange. The court took into account that all of the activities of the partnership were carried
on in the United Kingdom, except that the taxpayer gave final authorisation for all the transactions entered
into from South Africa.86 The finding by the court in Black
partnership income was located in the United Kingdom (where his capital was employed) does not seem
to accord with the rule laid down in Epstein (that the source of partnership income is located where the
individual partner carries on the business activities of the partnership). Lip service was paid to the Epstein
judgment by distinguishing it on the facts of the case. Importantly, the position as set out in Epstein, although
subject to criticism, currently remains the legal position on the location of the source of partnership income
under the South African common law.
4.3 The influence of legislation
The source rules as set out above derive from the South African common law and are subject to legislative
override, if applicable. The common law rules surrounding the source of partnership income may potentially
be impacted by s 9, which contains deemed source rules or s 24H, which deals with persons carrying on
trade in partnership.
Section 9 of the Act is specifically aimed at determining the source of certain kinds of income. This provision
deems certain items to arise from a South African source87 and conversely deems certain other items to
arise from a source outside South Africa.88 It is important to note that a partnership
being fiscally transparent, are treated as conduits. As a result, any income flowing through the partnership
to the partners retains its nature (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:186). Therefore, individual items of income (for
example, dividends, interest, royalties and exchange differences) flowing through a partnership to its
partners may very well be impacted by the deeming provisions contained in s 9. It should be noted that s 9
contains no deeming provisions in relation to the source of the business income of a partnership or income
for services rendered, except where those services are rendered to government agencies. The common
law rules regarding the source of these kinds of income therefore remain relevant.
It has not yet been settled in a South African court whether the introduction of s 24H has an impact on the
rules relating to the source of partnership income as laid down in Epstein. The purpose of s 24H is twofold:
86 The outcome in Binding Private Ruling (BPR) 222 issued by SARS on 18 February 2016 seems to be aligned with the reasoning in
Black that income will be regarded as deriving from a foreign source if the business activities of a partnership are substantially carried
on outside South Africa, despite the fact that a partner may be deriving a share of the partnership profit while living in South Africa.
s being
given and are only binding between SARS and the taxpayer concerned on the specific conditions as set out in the particular BPR.
87 In terms of s 9(2). For example, local dividends (s 9(2)(a)).
88 In terms of s 9(4). For example, foreign dividends (s 9(4)(a)).
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first, it limits the expend [s] 89
and second, it deems income accruing to the partnership to simultaneously accrue to the individual partners
in accordance with their profit share90 (Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Amendment Bill,
1988:21).
The fact that s 24H(5)(a)91 deems income accruing to the partnership to simultaneously accrue to the
individual partners may at first glance create the impression that the provision may have an impact on the
source of partnership profits. However, the provision is merely aimed at the timing of accrual and was
introduced to combat the postponement of tax by partners based on the common law rule that was laid
down in Sacks (which was that partners only become entitled to partnership profits once accounts are
rendered in accordance with the partnership agreement) (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:169-170).
Section 24H(2) deems every partner to be carrying on the business of the partnership. It has been
suggested, albeit subtly, that s 24H(2) may somehow have an impact on the rules surrounding the source
of partnership income as laid down in Epstein (De Koker & Williams, 2016:para. 11.1 fn 1). However, s
24H(2) is likewise not aimed at source. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the provision was
introduced to clarify that limited partners are entitled to deductions (1988:22), albeit limited in terms of s
24H(3). The question arises whether s 24H(2) can have the unintended consequence of affecting the rules
relating to the source of partnership profits. This outcome would be significant on the basis that the provision
The outcome
of applying s 24H(2) to partners is that they are deemed to carry on the business of the partnership. It does
not prescribe where the partners are deemed to carry on the business of the partnership, which leaves
those partners to be deemed to carry on the business of the partnership wherever they may be.92 If the
provision
There is no indication in s 24H of the Act nor in the 1988 Explanatory Memorandum that s 24H was intended
to change the rules surrounding the source of partnership income as developed under the common law. In
the absence of legislative override, the principles laid down in Epstein remain the leading authority on the
source of partnership income. If there was ever an intention to vary the common law source rules, one
89 In terms of s 24H(3).
90 In terms of s 24H(5).
91 Which also expressly
92 The outcome in BPR 222 seems to suggest that SARS will not apply s 24H(2) as a source provision. The applicant in BPR 222 was
a German resident who would become a South African resident while remaining a 100% limited partner of a limited liability foreign
partnership, which in turn was a 100% limited partner of two further limited liability foreign partnerships which each carried on business
though a PE in Germany. SARS ruled that the applicant would be entitled to a s 6quat rebate (credit) against foreign taxes paid by
the three foreign partnerships, thus presupposing foreign sourced income in the hands of the applicant as required in terms of s
6quat(1A). Presumably SARS reached the conclusion that the appl
source due to the partnership business activities substantially being confined to Germany (see, in this regard, Black), despite the
applicant partner moving to South Africa (where s 24H(2) would deem him to be carrying on the business of the partnership).
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would expect to see an insertion in s 9 of the Act relating to the source of partnership income, which
specifically deals with the source of particular items of income.
4.4 Conclusion
South Africa levies taxes on income based on the tax residence of the taxpayer or the source of the income.
Tax residence or source is therefore a means of establishing jurisdiction to tax, which is a prerequisite
before South Africa may proceed to impose taxes. Persons who are South African resident for income tax
purposes may be taxed in South Africa on their worldwide income, whereas persons who are not South
African resident are only taxed on income derived from a source in South Africa.
Source rules have developed in terms of the common law. The majority decision in Epstein, although
subject to criticism, remains the leading authority on the source of partnership income. Insofar as the
business income of a partnership is concerned,
particular partner carries on the business activities of the partnership. The dissenting view is that the source
of a located where the business profits of the partnership are realised.
Section 24H of the Act was not intended to alter the common law rules relating to the source of partnership
income. It is submitted that this provision furthermore does not have the effect, whether intended or
unintended, of altering the common law position relating to source. Section 9, on the other hand, is
specifically aimed at deeming the source of certain items of income to be located in South Africa or outside
South Africa in certain circumstances. Indeed, should items of income listed in s 9 (eg dividends, interest,
royalties and exchange differences) accrue to a partnership, such income would retain its nature while
flowing through to the hands of the partners and the deeming source provisions contained in s 9 may very
well apply to those specific items. There are no deeming provisions relating to the source of the business
income accruing to a partnership and accordingly the common law rules laid down in Esptein should still
apply.
Where South African source income is present, this will not necessarily lead to the existence of a PE in
South Africa as these two concepts are based on very different rules. However, the source of income may
serve as the necessary connecting factor and will especially be important in the context where non-resident
partners have a presence or are involved in activities in South Africa. In this scenario, South Africa should,
in the absence of South African source income, not have the requisite jurisdiction to impose taxes on those
non-resident partners and there will furthermore be no basis for the application of the terms of a DTA in
terms of which a PE may have been found to exist.
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5. Permanent establishments
5.1 Introduction to the application of DTAs to partnerships93
The term PE is comprehensively defined in art 5 of the MTCs published by the OECD, UN and SADC
respectively.94 The existence of a PE in terms of a DTA usually allows the Contracting State95 in which the
PE is located to exercise its domestic taxing rights in respect of the profits that are attributable to the PE of
a non-resident enterprise (OECD Commentary, 2014:C(5)-1 para. 1). A PE, if found to exist, may therefore
have a significant impact on the taxation of a cross-border partnership.
The existence of a PE in terms of a DTA presupposes that the particular DTA applies to the circumstances
at hand. DTAs generally only apply to persons who are regarded as residents of at least one of the
Contracting States that are a party to the particular DTA.96
The OECD MTC and the UN MTC a company and any other
body of persons.97 The OECD Commentary98 on art 3
widely construed so as to include all partnerships (2016:C(3)-1 para. 2). On the other hand, the SADC MTC
an individual, a company and any other body of persons that is treated as
an entity for tax purposes.99 The SADC Commentary100 on art 3 confirms that the reference to bodies of
persons that are treated as entities for tax purposes are meant to limit the application of the SADC MTC to
partnerships that are taxable at entity level (2011:5). Any particular DTA may of course be negotiated so
as to expressly include or exclude fiscally transparent part
as used in the DTA.101
excluded from the application of the DTA under consideration, the further question arises whether the
partnership can be regarded as a resident. is described in art 4 of the
OECD, UN and SADC MTCs as any person who is liable to tax under the domestic laws of that State by
reason of domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature but excludes
persons who are liable to tax in that State solely in respect of income from sources in that State or capital
situated therein.
93 See, in general, the OECD Partnership Report.
94 The UN and SADC MTCs are largely based on the OECD MTC and therefore these three MTCs follow the same structure.
95
96 Article 4 of the OECD, UN and SADC MTCs.
97 Article 3(1)(a).
98 Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention.
99 Article 3(1)(k).
100 Commentary on the Articles of the SADC Model Tax Agreement.
101 See Olivier and Honiball for examples involving South Africa (2011:185).
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in terms of the DTA entered into between South Africa and Lesotho
was interpreted by the High Court in Grundlingh. The court held at 10 para. 10.8 that the partnership in that
case was not an enterprise liable to tax in Lesotho and therefore that the provisions of the DTA did not
apply. Hattingh, although agreeing with the outcome of the case, criticises this statement by the court as
the individual partner was indeed the enterprise liable to tax which led to the application of the DTA
(2010:24, 28). The court in Grundlingh on whether the
partnership was in principle liable to tax in terms of substantive income tax legislation and disregarded any
related administrative practices such as, for example, joint returns (Hattingh 2010:27). South African
domestic partnerships
regarded DTAs based on the OECD and UN MTCs on the basis that partnerships
and foreign partnerships are fiscally transparent and therefore in principle not liable to tax (Olivier &
Honiball, 2011:185).102
When interpreting a particular DTA, a South African court, although not bound by the relevant commentary,
may have regard to the relevant commentary insofar as it assists the court in the interpretation and
application of the provisions contained in the DTA.103 Especially the OECD Commentary has proven very
valuable in promoting a uniform interpretation of DTAs on an international level (Vogel & Rust, 2015:45).
The OECD Commentary on art 4 confirms that where a fiscally transparent partnership is excluded from
the application of a DTA as a result of not being liable to tax, the partners themselves would be the persons
who are liable to tax in respect of the partnership income. Therefore the individual partners should be
allowed to claim the benefits of DTAs concluded by the States of which they are residents in relation to the
partnership income accruing to them (2014: C(4)-4 para. 8.8).104 This accords with the approach suggested
in the UN Commentary105 on art 1  that, in the absence of special provisions, the partners should be entitled
to benefits of the DTA if the partnership is regarded as a mere conduit (2011:42 para. 5).
Once it is established whether a particular DTA applies to a partnership or the individual partners, the further
question arises in which circumstances the presence or activities of a partner or partners in South Africa
may give rise to the creation of a PE in relation to the business of a partnership.
102 Fiscally transparent partnerships would not even pass the first hurdle required for the application of DTAs that follow the wording
of a
103 See, in particular, Downing.
104 This approach accords with the approach suggested in the UN Commentary (UN Commentaries on the Articles of the UN MTC)
on art 1 (2011:42 para. 5) that, in the absence of special provisions, the partners should be entitled to the benefits of the UN MTC if
the partnership is regarded as a mere conduit.
105 UN Commentaries on the Articles of the UN MTC.
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5.2 Brief overview of the PE concept106
T in terms of section 1 of the Act to mean a PE as defined
from time to time in art 5 of the OECD MTC.107
There are two schools of thought on the interpretation of DTAs, namely the ambulatory and the static
approach (Vogel & Rust, 2015:66-67). The ambulatory approach supports the interpretation of a DTA in
accordance with the law at the relevant time when the DTA is to be relied on, whereas the static approach
requires that the DTA be interpreted in line with the law as it stood when the DTA was concluded (Vogel &
Rust, 2015:66). This issue has not yet been definitively settled in a South African court. However, the OECD
MTC (full version) now specifically supports an ambulatory interpretation (2014:I-3 para. 9). Furthermore,
in the South African domestic definition of a PE suggests a
preference for the ambulatory approach in the interpretation of the PE term, at least under South African
domestic law.
(Reimer, 2015:334)
The existence of a PE in terms of a DTA allows the country in which the PE is located108 to exercise its
taxing rights in respect of the business profits attributable to the PE of a non-resident enterprise, while the
residence state of that enterprise is required to forego its taxing rights in respect of that income (Reimer,
2015:334).
The allocation of taxing rights in relation to business profits is dealt with in art 7 of the OECD, UN and SADC
MTCs. Article 7(1) of these MTCs allocates taxing rights in relation to the business profits of an enterprise
to the state of residence, unless the enterprise carries on business in the other state through a PE situated
therein, in which case the other state may tax the business profits that are attributable to that PE.109
The term 110 All of these MTCs provide
that items of income that are specifically dealt with in other provisions should not be affected by art 7
106 An exhaustive analysis of the term PE is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the focus will be on the attributes of a partnership
or foreign partnership that may have an impact on the PE enquiry.
107 The South African domestic definition of a PE contains a carve-out for acts that relate to financial instruments in that when
of a partner en commandite) in relation to a
partnership, trust or foreign partnership has a PE in South Africa, any act of that partnership, trust or foreign partnership in respect of
108 Referred to as the source state (Reimer, 2015:334).
109 Article 7(1) of the UN MTC casts a wider net than its counterparts in the OECD MTC and SADC MTC by not only affording taxing
rights to the other state in respect of the profits attributable to the PE, but also in respect of sales in the other state of goods or
merchandise of the same or similar kind as those sold through the PE or other business activities carried on in the other state of the
same or similar kind as those effected through the PE.
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governing business profits.111 This is significant in the context of a fiscally transparent partnership as income
flowing through such a partnership to the partners will retain its nature (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:186), for
example as interest, which will then fall to be dealt with in terms of the specific interest provisions contained
in art 11 of the particular DTA.
A PE can only exist in ng rights are then only allowed to be exercised by the
state in which the PE is located if the business of the enterprise is carried on through that PE. The meaning
ce as there can be no PE without an enterprise. The
meaning attributed to "enterprise" is very wide and means the carrying on of any business.112
in a wide sense as illustrated in the well-known statement by
Jessel MR in Smith v Anderson, (1880) 15 ChD 247 at 258 that anything which occupies the time and
attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit is business The OECD MTC113 and the SADC
MTC114 the performance of professional services and other activities
of an independent character while the UN MTC is silent on the meaning of the term. Where the MTC does
not define a term, countries may defer to the meaning thereof under their domestic law, unless the context
of the DTA requires otherwise.115
With the exception of certain universal partnerships, a partnership necessarily involves the carrying on of a
business. A partnership itself is therefore capable of being regarded as the carrying on of an enterprise,
regardless as to whether the partnership has legal personality or is liable to tax.116 It is submitted, however,
that it should be irrelevant whether a PE of a partnership exists in a state wherein that partnership is not
liable to tax at partnership level as that state would have no jurisdiction to tax a PE of an entity that is not
susceptible to taxes at entity level. In the case of a fiscally transparent partnership, one looks to the partners
themselves, who may each be regarded as having a PE that is liable to tax (OECD Partnership Report,
R(15)-26 para. 81). Each partner of a fiscally transparent partnership may therefore be regarded as carrying
on an enterprise in relation to which a PE may be found to exist, although this may not necessarily extend
to extraordinary partners who often do not carry on the business activities of the partnership.
Olivier and Honiball note that, where a partner entity , a partner cannot
create a PE for the partnership itself (2011:187). Presumably this view is held because those jurisdictions
would simply look through the partnership to the individual partners when imposing taxes. This view is
111 In terms of art 7(4) of the OECD MTC, art 7(6) of the UN MTC and art 7(7) of the SADC MTC.
112 In terms of art 3(1)(c) of the OECD MTC and art 3(1)(g) of the SADC MTC. Article 3(1)(c) of the UN MTC widens the term even
further by describing an enterprise as something carried on by a resident of one of the Contracting States.
113 Article 3(1)(h).
114 Article 3(1)(d).
115 Article 3(2) of the OECD, UN and SADC MTCs.
116 See the OECD Partnership Report at R(15)-26 para. 81 in which reference is made to the enterprise carried on by a fiscally
transparent partnership.
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supported by the OECD Commentary on art 5 in the context of building sites or construction or installation
projects lasting more than 12 months.117 Although the 12 month test is applied at partnership level (ie
looking at the time spent collectively by all the partners and employees of the partnership at the site), if the
time spent at the site by representatives of a fiscally transparent enterprise exceeds 12 months, each
partner will be considered to have a PE for purposes of the taxation of their share of the business profits of
the partnership (OECD Commentary, C(5)-12 para. 19.1).
Olivier and Honiball further note that an ordinary partner can give rise to the existence of a PE as ordinary
partners generally carry on the business of the partnership (2011:188). On the other hand, an extraordinary
partner may not always be regarded as carrying on the business of the partnership (which is a prerequisite
of an enterprise), thus rendering it difficult for a PE to have been created (2011:188). In a South African
domestic context, s 24H(2) of the Act deems every partner to be carrying on the business or trade of a
partnership, notwithstanding that such partner may be a limited partner. Olivier and Honiball rightly question
the application of such a domestic provision when interpreting international treaties118 and point out that it
should be investigated on the facts of each case whether an extraordinary partner is indeed engaged in
carrying on the business of the partnership (2011:188).
The wording of art 5 as it appears in the current versions of the OECD, UN and SADC MTCs are compared
in table format in Annexure C hereto. In brief, the PE article contains a general definition as well as a few
specific provisions which in some instances elaborate on the general definition of a PE and in other
instances stand alone as separate tests as to whether or not a PE has been created.
The general definition of a PE is described in art 5(1) of the OECD, UN and SADC MTCs as a fixed place
of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. All of the terms used
in the general definition have been debated at length as will appear from the various Commentary. In
determining whether the required degree of permanency has been maintained so as to constitute a fixed
place of business, regard may be had to the activities of related persons (OECD Commentary, 2014: C(5)-
6 para. 6.2), which will likely entail looking at the business activities of a partnership as a whole, which may
be carried on by any one or more of the partners.119 Significant in the partnership context is that the general
definition only recognises a PE if the business of an enterprise is at least partly carried on through that
enterprise. Thus persons holding passive investments should not give rise to the creation of a PE (Reimer,
2015:338). On the basis that the domestic provisions contained in s 24H(2) should not apply in the
interpretation of art 5(1), extraordinary partners should be less at risk of creating a PE on behalf of the
partnership or co-partners than their ordinary counterparts. However, it remains a factual enquiry and
117 See art 5(3).
118 Although the court in Grundlingh relied on s 24H(2), this was not done in order to determine whether a PE had been created in
terms of a DTA.
119 (Reimer,
2015:355).
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extraordinary partners in name who in fact carry on the business of the partnership would not be considered
to be passive investors.
Article 5(2) goes on to list examples of places that could constitute PEs provided such places meet the
general requirements laid down in art 5(1) (OECD Commentary, 2014: C(5)-9 para. 12; UN Commentary,
2011: 105 para. 4; SADC Commentary, 2011: 7).120
Article 5(3) is an alternative test for the creation of a PE that relates specifically to building sites or
construction or installation projects and, in the case of the UN and SADC MTCs also extends to so-called
services PEs. It is conceivable that partners may be rendering services in South Africa as their contribution
to the partnership or otherwise, as will be more fully explored in 5.4 below.
Article 5(4) excludes activities that are purely of a preparatory or auxiliary character from creating a PE.
Article 5(5) determines that a PE will be created where a person is acting on behalf of an enterprise and
has, and habitually exercises, an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise in respect of
any activities which that person undertakes for the enterprise, unless the activities of that person are limited
to activities of a preparatory or auxiliary character as listed in art 5(4).
Commentary, 2014: C(5)-18 para. 32). The test contained in art 5(5) is an alternative test
to the general definition of a PE contained in art 5(1). Therefore, art 5(5) is not subject to the requirements
of art 5(1) and a PE can be created by meeting the requirements of art 5(1) or art 5(5) (OECD Commentary,
2014: C(5)-19- C(5)-20 para. 35). Article 5(5) is of particular relevance to partnerships, especially in light of
the implied mutual mandate amongst ordinary partners, as will be more fully explored in 5.3 below.
On the other hand, independent agents simply acting in the ordinary course of their business on behalf of
an enterprise should not give rise to the creation of a PE for that enterprise due to art 5(6).121
5.3 Authority to conclude contracts in the name of an enterprise art 5(5)
The fact that partners are generally regarded as agents of one another under the South African common
law is of great importance in determining whether a PE has been created in terms of the alternative test as
contained in art 5(5) of the OECD, UN and SADC MTCs.122 It should be noted that an enterprise need not
120 See, however, a different view held by the Tax Court in
Note that Tax Court decisions do not create binding legal precedent in South Africa.
121 Article 5(6) of the OECD and SADC MTCs as well as art 5(7) of the UN MTC.
122 Article 5(5) of the SADC MTC follows its equivalent in the OECD MTC to the letter (SADC Commentary, 2011: 9). The UN MTC
contains a further alternative test for the creation of a PE in art 5(5)(b) thereof where a person who has no authority to conclude
contracts in the name of an enterprise habitually maintains a stock of goods or merchandise from which that person regularly delivers
goods or merchandise on behalf of the enterprise.
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have a fixed place of business in order for a PE to have been created in terms of art 5(5) as this test is not
subject to the general requirements contained in art 5(1).
Article 5(5) deems a PE to have been created in a Contracting State if a person, who has the authority to
conclude contracts in the name of an enterprise, habitually exercises such authority in that Contracting
State. As the granting of authority is a relationship emanating from private law, the rules of private
international law should be used to determine whether a person actually had the authority to conclude
contracts in the name of the enterprise (Reimer, 2015:387). The fact that contracts have to be concluded
in the name of the enterprise indicates that the dependent agent must have the necessary authority to
achieve direct representation,123 which authority must be habitually exercised. Whether authority has
indeed been habitually exercised, is a factual enquiry which will depend largely on the business of the
enterprise (OECD Commentary, 2014: C(5)-19 para. 33.1).
The term authority as used in art 5(5) seems to be meant in a technical legal sense. In order to determine
whether an agent indeed had authority, regard must be had to the appropriate law governing the granting
authority, as opposed to ostensible authority (or estoppel by representation).124
Estoppel by representation should be distinguished from ratification after the fact. If a principal ratifies a
contract it is treated as having been properly authorised from the beginning, whereas estoppel by
representation simply prevents a principal from denying the misrepresentation that was created. It is
therefore submitted that an agent who habitually concludes contracts in the name of an enterprise without
the necessary authority can give rise to a PE in terms of art 5(5), provided the enterprise ratifies such
contracts retrospectively. Note that ratification can occur expressly or tacitly via conduct. On the other hand,
ostensible authority or estoppel should not give rise to a PE by virtue of art 5(5) as there is no actual
authority in such case.
It must be borne in mind that actual implied authority arises automatically by virtue of the conclusion of any
partnership agreement under the South African common law. This implied authority or mutual mandate is
recognised as actual authority amongst ordinary partners, albeit not expressly granted.
implied authority is limited to the business of the partnership. Art 5(5) also envisages the entering into of
contracts that relate to the business of the enterprise (OECD Commentary, C(5)-18 para. 33). Ordinary
partners that habitually conclude contracts in the name of the partnership (ie the partners in common) in
123 The contract need not be in the exact name of the enterprise, provided the parties clearly intended that the enterprise be bound to
the contract, as opposed to the agent (OECD Commentary, 2014: C(5)-18 para. 32.1). Direct representation in terms of the South
African law of agency likewise does not require that the name of the principal actually be used, as long as the intention is clear.
124
(2014: C(5)-18 para. 32.1).
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accordance with their implied authority will therefore be at great risk of creating a PE for themselves and
each one of their co-partners by virtue of art 5(5).
The successful application of the doctrine of the undisclosed principal should not fall within the ambit of art
5(5). Rather, a person acting for an undisclosed principal may very well be regarded as an independent
agent in terms of art 5(6), which does not give rise to the creation of a PE without more. Although the
outcome of applying the doctrine of the undisclosed principal may resemble direct representation in that
the undisclosed principal, once disclosed, may eventually become bound to the legal relationship flowing
from the contract, the agent would not conclude the contract in the name of the undisclosed principal and
need therefore not have had the authority to do so. A situation that qualifies for the application of the doctrine
of the undisclosed principal should therefore be disqualified from the application of art 5(5) and may possibly
fall within the ambit of art 5(6).
Ordinary partners are therefore at great risk of creating a PE for themselves and their co-partners in terms
of art 5(5). Extraordinary partners, on the other hand, should in theory be no more at risk of creating a PE
for their co-partners in terms of art 5(5) than any third party unrelated to the partnership. Extraordinary
partners are usually not allowed to interfere with the management of the partnership business and therefore
the implied authority or mutual mandate does not extend to such partners. If, however, the partners in
common granted actual authority, whether expressly or tacitly, to an extraordinary partner (or to any third
party) to conclude contracts in the name of the partnership, art 5(5) may apply. Where an extraordinary
partner or a third party was held out to be an ordinary partner, such person may potentially be held liable
as an ordinary partner by bona fide third parties, however, actual authority cannot be said to have been
granted and therefore art 5(5) should not apply.
Ordinary partners represent each other as agents of their partnership business when dealing with the
outside world. However, partners usually do not represent their extraordinary co-partners whose identities
and involvement in the partnership are meant to be kept secret. Therefore, ordinary partners that conclude
contracts in the name of the partnership, although potentially creating a PE for their ordinary co-partners,
should not be able to create a PE for their extraordinary partners by virtue of art 5(5).
5.4 Services PE art 5(3)(b)
An additional test for the creation of a PE may become relevant in the partnership context where partners
perform services in South Africa as their contribution to a cross-border partnership or otherwise where
partners stay involved in the business of the partnership by the rendering of services.125 This is referred to
125 Extraordinary partners are not likely to render services to the partnership as their names and involvement in the partnership are
meant to be kept secret.
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as the so-called services PE, which can be found in art 5(3)(b) of the UN and SADC MTCs. The OECD
MTC does not currently contain a services PE.
Article 5(3)(b) is a further alternative test for the creation of a PE which need not necessarily comply with
the requirements of the general definition contained in art 5(1). A PE encompasses the furnishing of
services, including consultancy services, by an enterprise through employees or other personnel engaged
by the enterprise for such purpose, but only if activities of that nature continue (for the same or a connected
project) within a Contracting State for a period or periods aggregating more than 183 days in any 12-month
period commencing or ending in the fiscal year concerned.126
The question arises whether partners may be considered as employees or other personnel as envisaged
in art 5(3)(b) of the UN and SADC MTCs. It seems that where a partnership does not have legal personality
in terms of the laws of its country of formation, the partners cannot be regarded as employees of the
partnership (Olivier & Honiball, 2011:186-187). This seems to be implied in the OECD Commentary in the
context of fiscally transparent partnerships having building sites or construction or installation projects
lasting more than 12 months,127
C(5)-12 para. 19.1). The result is that the services PE contained in art 5(3)(b) of the UN
and SADC MTCs in its current form should not apply to the activities of a partner of a partnership that is not
regarded as a legal entity, as such a partner would not be regarded as an employee of the partnership. On
the other hand, where a partnership is regarded as a legal entity in terms of the laws of the source country,
the partners may be regarded as employees of the partnership, which may give rise to the application of
art 5(3)(b).
If one has regard to, for instance, the variation of the services PE as contained in art 5(3)(b) of the DTA
between South Africa and the United Kingdom,128 it seems that the services PE can easily be extended to
the activities of a partner, notwithstanding the legal personality of the partnership, by substituting the words
UN
DTA.
In order to constitute a services PE, the relevant activities carried on in a Contracting Sate must be of the
same nature and must relate to the same or a related project (Reimer, 2015:403-404).
126 Article 5(3)(b) of the UN MTC. Article 5(3)(b) of the SADC MTC contains similar wording, although the 183-day time period is not
stipulated and it is left to the Contracting States to negotiate the maximum time period.
127 Article 5(3) of the OECD MTC.
128 Convention between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland for The Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
and on Capital Gains, 2003.
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The South African Tax Court in ITC 13276 recently considered the creation of a PE by way of the rendering
of services by employees of a foreign company in South Africa. In that case, the Tax Court was called upon
to interpret the services PE clause in terms of the DTA between South Africa and the USA.129 The services
PE clause in that DTA follows the wording of art 5(3)(b) of the UN MTC, although inserted as art 5(2)(k),
where one would ordinarily expect to see examples of what could constitute a PE if the requirements of the
general definition contained in art 5(1) are met. With respect, the court erred at para. 39 by interpreting the
without having
to meet the requirements of art 5(1). The judgment has been subject to strong criticism130 and is problematic
in several respects.131 As a decision of the Tax Court, the judgment does not create binding legal precedent
(Hattingh, 2015:917).
When considering the creation of a PE of a partnership or the partners as a result of services rendered by
the partners, it is therefore important to first ascertain whether the particular DTA under consideration
contains a service PE clause. Secondly, it should be determined whether the services PE can apply to
partners or only to employees / personnel. Once it has been established that a services PE clause could
apply to services rendered by the partners, it has unfortunately not been definitively settled how a South
African court should interpret such a clause. In light of the earlier decision in Downing, in which a court
capable of creating legal precedent relied on the OECD commentary, the approach suggested in ITC 13276
(which does not constitute binding legal precedent) may not be appropriate. In particular, the importance of
the commentary, which often clearly describes the purpose of a proposed provision, should not be
underestimated in interpreting similar provisions contained in DTAs.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter 5 considered in brief the meaning of a PE as contained in art 5 of the OECD, UN and SADC
MTCs with particular focus on the attributes of a partnership that may be of relevance in the PE context.
The term PE as contained in the UN and SADC MTCs is largely based on the wording and structure of the
OECD MTC.
The existence of a PE in terms of a DTA allows the Contracting State in which the PE of an enterprise is
located to exercise its taxing rights in relation to the business profits attributable to that PE. Business profits
that are not attributable to a PE are only taxed in the state of residence.132 Business profits exclude all items
of income that are specifically dealt with in terms of other articles in the MTCs.
129 Convention between the Republic of South Africa and the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, 1997.
130 See Hattingh (2015: 911-955).
131 For example, the court relied on the US Technical Explanation, which is a unilateral document, in interpreting the DTA.
132 Article 7 of the OECD, UN and SADC MTCs.
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The PE and source concepts should not be confused. In the previous chapter it was explained that source
(which is a concept of domestic law) could serve as the connecting factor in relation to the presence or
activities of non-residents in South Africa, thus providing South Africa with the requisite jurisdiction to tax
and serving as a basis for the application of a DTA.
DTAs only apply to persons who are residents of a Contracting State. The term resident only extends to
persons who are liable to tax in at least one of the Contracting States by reason of, for example, residence.
Absent any special provisions in a particular DTA, fiscally transparent partnerships are excluded from
claiming the benefits of a DTA as they are not liable to tax. Where the benefits of a DTA are denied to the
partnership due to fiscal transparency, the individual partners may usually claim the benefits of the DTA.
In the context of a fiscally transparent partnership, each one of the partners will likely constitute an
enterprise in relation to which a PE can potentially be created.
The general definition of a PE as contained in art 5(1) of the OECD, UN and SADC MTCs describes a PE
as a fixed place of business through which the business of the enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.
There are many intricacies in the interpretation of these terms. Significant in a partnership context is that
extraordinary partners are usually not regarded as carrying on the business of the partnership. This cannot
be remedied by the deeming provision contained in s 24H(2) of the Act as it would be inappropriate to rely
on domestic provisions in the interpretation of DTAs that were negotiated bilaterally.
The dependent agent article (art 5(5)) is particularly relevant in a partnership context due to the mutual
mandate that exists automatically amongst partners. Ordinary partners of a fiscally transparent partnership
that habitually conclude contracts in the name of the partnership (ie their co-partners) in accordance with
their implied authority (which is regarded as a form of actual authority) are at great risk of creating a PE for
themselves and each one of their co-partners by virtue of art 5(5). This relevance of art 5(5) does not extend
to extraordinary partners as extraordinary partners are not entrusted with managing the partnership
business as agents of their co-partners. Furthermore, ordinary partners that conclude contracts in the name
of the partnership, although potentially creating a PE for their ordinary co-partners, should not be able to
create a PE for their extraordinary partners (who do not carry on the business of the partnership) by virtue
of art 5(5).
The services PE clause, although not appearing in the OECD MTC, is included in certain DTAs that have
been entered into by South Africa.133 The wording of the services PE clause as currently contained in art
5(3)(b) of the UN and SADC MTCs relates to services rendered by employees of an enterprise for longer
than certain periods of time. It would seem that partners of partnerships that are not regarded as legal
133 For example, the DTAs entered into with the USA and the UK respectively.
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entities will not be regarded as employees of that partnership. However, partners may potentially give rise
to the creation of a PE in terms of art 5(3)(b) where they are also regarded as employees of a partnership
that constitutes a legal entity.
It is evident that a PE can be created in terms of a number of different clauses as contained in art 5 of the
different MTCs. When a particular DTA is being considered, the variations in wording and special provisions
of that DTA should be carefully considered.
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6. Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
This paper sought to establish whether the presence or activities of a partner or partners in South Africa
creates (or is at risk of creating) a PE for that partner, the partnership or the co-partners in South Africa.
The focus was on the key legal and fiscal attributes of a fiscally transparent partnership in the South African
domestic context with the aim of identifying aspects specific to partnerships that may impact on the creation
of a PE.
6.2 Summary of conclusions
It was established that certain aspects of a partnership are particularly relevant in the PE context. Moreover,
different considerations apply between different kinds of partners (and partnerships), most notably between
ordinary and extraordinary partners.
The provisions of the MTCs published by the OECD, UN and SADC respectively were used as guidelines
for DTAs entered into with South Africa as one of the Contracting States. It was found that ordinary partners,
by virtue of the implied authority arising from the partnership agreement, can be regarded as dependent
agents who are therefore particularly at risk of creating a PE for themselves and their co-partners in terms
of art 5(5) of DTAs based on these MTCs, provided they habitually exercise such authority. On the other
hand, the so-called services PE as contained in art 5(3)(b) of the UN and SADC MTCs does not seem to
be a comfortable fit for partners of a partnership that is not regarded as a legal entity. However, where the
services PE clause appears in a slightly amended form in DTAs concluded by South Africa (eg by reference
to individuals as opposed to employees), this may very well place partners at risk of creating a PE for the
partnership or their co-partners if they render services in South Africa to the partnership (whether as their
contribution to the partnership or otherwise) for a time period that exceeds the stipulated time period laid
down in the particular DTA.
Whereas ordinary partners are particularly at risk of creating a PE for their co-partners, the opposite is true
of extraordinary partners. This is, in short, because extraordinary partners would normally not be carrying
on the business of the partnership, not be entrusted with the necessary authority to manage the business
of the partnership and not render any services to the partnership. It should also be noted that the risk of
ordinary partners creating a PE for their co-partners is more relevant to creating a PE for their ordinary co-
partners as extraordinary partners (whose names and involvement in the partnership business are meant
to be kept secret) often do not carry on the enterprise of the partnership.
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6.3 Conclusions relative to research question
The law of partnership in South Africa is based on the common law as greatly influenced by the writing of
Pothier. The legal consequences of a partnership flow from the partnership agreement, which does not
create a legal entity under South African law. South Africa therefore follows the aggregate approach which
views the partnership as an aggregate of the partners and not a legal person in and of itself. From this
position in the common law it follows that a partnership is considered as fiscally transparent in South Africa,
ie the income flows through the partnership, while retaining its nature, to be taxed in the hands of the
individual partners.
An important distinction is drawn between ordinary and extraordinary partners. Extraordinary partners are
not partners in the full sense of the word as they are not regarded as agents of their co-partners and
moreover their co-partners are not regarded as their agents. One could in this sense regard extraordinary
partners as passive investors in a partnership in relation to which many of the normal consequences of a
partnership agreement would not apply.
On the other hand, an implied actual authority to conclude contracts related to the business of the
partnership is automatically granted to the ordinary partners in a partnership by virtue of the partnership
agreement. If such authority is habitually exercised, the ordinary co-partners of the partnership are
particularly vulnerable to having a PE created for each of them. This is because in the context of a fiscally
transparent partnership, the partners themselves are regarded as the relevant enterprises in relation to
which a PE can be found to exist.
An important aspect that may sometimes be overlooked is that the provisions of a DTA cannot be relied on
by a Contracting State in the absence of the requisite jurisdiction to tax. This is because DTAs do not
introduce the right to tax but rather limit the right of a Contracting State to enforce domestic tax provisions,
provided the DTA applies in the circumstances. In the absence of the requisite jurisdiction to tax, which can
be established by way of tax residence or source, a state may not rely on the creation of a PE as a means
of imposing tax.
In the context of cross-border partnerships, especially involving non-resident partners, the special rules
surrounding the source of partnership income as developed under the common law was therefore
considered, as well as the impact of legislation. It was found that, although the deeming source provisions
contained in s 9 of the Act will have an impact on certain specific items of income flowing to the partners
(such as deeming local dividends to be of a South African source), the source rules regarding the business
profits of partnership income currently remain unaffected by s 9 of the Act. Moreover, s 24H of the Act
concerning persons carrying on trade or business in a partnership, although of particular importance to the
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domestic rules surrounding the taxation of partnership income in South Africa, does not affect the rules on
the source of partnership income. Although subject to criticism, the position under South African domestic
is located where that partner carries on the business activities of the partnership.
Provided South Africa has the requisite jurisdiction to tax income in the hands of a particular partner, it is in
each case of great importance to establish whether a PE for that partner in South Africa has been created
by virtue of the presence or activities of the ordinary co-partners in South Africa, in which case the business
profits attributable to that PE should be taxed only in the Contracting State where the PE is located.
6.4 Recommendations for future research
The taxation of cross-border partnerships remains subject to much uncertainty and further research is
necessary. In particular, the consequences of having created a PE for the partnership or the partners is
beyond the scope of this paper. It is recommended that further research be conducted on the attribution of
income in the context where a PE has been created for a partnership or co-partners. The relevance of
domestic source rules to the attribution of income to a partnership PE should also be investigated,
especially in light of the unique source rules developed in relation to the source of partnership income as
discussed in chapter 4 above. Included in the consequences of creating a PE for the co-partners in South
Africa is the associated administrative burden of potentially having to register all the non-resident partners
in a cross-border partnership for income tax in South Africa, especially where the partnership, having
numerous non-resident partners, introduces but a few limited activities in South Africa. This is especially
important as uncertainty relating to the administrative requirements may discourage cross-border
partnerships from expanding their operations to South Africa.
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Appendices
A. Section 24H of the Income Tax Act
24H. Persons carrying on trade or business in partnership. (1) For the purposes of this section,
means any member of a partnership en commandite, an anonymous partnership, any similar partnership or
a foreign partnership, if such membe
member has contributed or undertaken to contribute to the partnership or is in any other way limited.
[Sub-s. (1) substituted by s. 46 (1) (a) of Act No. 7 of 2010 with effect from the commencement of years of assessment
commencing on or after 1 October, 2011 in the case of any foreign partnership that is established or formed before
24 August, 2010, and with effect from the date of establishment or formation in the case of any foreign partnership that
is established or formed on or after 24 August, 2010 (Editorial Note: effective date in s. 46 (2) (a) of Act No. 7 of 2010
as substituted by s. 164 (1) of Act No. 24 of 2011).]
(2) Where any trade or business is carried on in partnership, each member of such partnership shall, notwithstanding
the fact that he may be a limited partner, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be carrying on such trade or
business.
(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act contained, the amount of any allowance or deduction which
may be granted to any taxpayer under any provision of this Act in respect of or in connection with any trade or business
carried on by him in a partnership in relation to which he is a limited partner shall not in the aggregate exceed the sum
of
(a)
which the taxpayer is or may be held liable to any creditor of the partnership; and
(b) any income received by or accrued to the taxpayer from such trade or business.
[Sub-s. (3) amended by s. 26 of Act No. 74 of 2002.]
(4) Any allowance or deduction which has been disallowed under the provisions of subsection (3) shall be carried
forward and be deemed to be an allowance or deduction to which the taxpayer is entitled in the succeeding year of
assessment.
(5) (a) Where any income has in common been received by or accrued to the members of any partnership or foreign
partnership, a portion (determined in accordance with any agreement between such members as to the ratio in which
the profits or losses of the partnership are to be shared) of such income shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any law or the relevant agreement of partnership, be deemed to have been received by or to have accrued
to each such member individually on the date upon which such income was received by or accrued to them in common.
[Para. (a) substituted by s. 46 (1) (b) of Act No. 7 of 2010 with effect from the commencement of years of assessment
commencing on or after 1 October, 2011 in the case of any foreign partnership that is established or formed before
24 August, 2010, and with effect from the date of establishment or formation in the case of any foreign partnership that
is established or formed on or after 24 August, 2010 (Editorial Note: effective date in s. 46 (2) (a) of Act No. 7 of 2010
as substituted by s. 164 (1) of Act No. 24 of 2011).]
(b) Where a portion of any income is under the provisions of paragraph (a) deemed to have been received by or to
have accrued to a taxpayer, a portion (determined as aforesaid) of any deduction or allowance which may be granted
under the provisions of this Act in the determination of the taxable income derived from such income shall be granted
[S. 24H inserted by s. 21 of Act No. 90 of 1988.]
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B. Definition of section 1 of the Income Tax Act
, in respect of any year of assessment, means any partnership, association, body of persons or
entity formed or established under the laws of any country other than the Republic if
(a) for the purposes of the laws relating to tax on income of the country in which that partnership, association, body of
persons or entity is formed or established
(i) each member of the partnership, association, body of persons or entity is required to take into account the
by or accrued to that partnership, association, body of persons or
entity when that amount is received by or accrued to the partnership, association, body of persons or entity;
and
(ii) the partnership, association, body of persons or entity is not liable for or subject to any tax on income, other
than a tax levied by a municipality, local authority or a comparable authority, in that country; or
[Sub-para. (ii) substituted by s. 3 (1) (g) of Act No. 25 of 2015 deemed to have come into operation on 31 December,
2015 and applicable in respect of years of assessment ending on or after that date.]
(b) where the country in which that partnership, association, body of persons or entity is formed or established does
not have any applicable laws relating to tax on income
(i) any amount
(aa) that is received by or accrued to; or
(bb) of expenditure that is incurred by,
the partnership, association, body of persons or entity is allocated concurrently with the receipt,
accrual or incurral to the members of that partnership, association, body of persons or entity in terms
of an agreement between those members; and
(ii) no amount distributed to a member of a partnership, association, body of persons or entity may exceed the
allocation contemplated in subparagraph (i) after taking into account any prior distributions made by the
partnership, association, body of persons or entity;
foreign partnership 6 (1) (j) of Act No. 7 of 2010 with effect from the commencement of
years of assessment commencing on or after 1 October, 2011 in the case of any foreign partnership that is established
or formed before 24 August, 2010, and with effect from the date of establishment or formation in the case of any foreign
partnership that is established or formed on or after 24 August, 2010 (Editorial Note: effective date in s. 6 (4) (a) of Act
No. 7 of 2010 as substituted by s. 159 (1) (b) of Act No. 24 of 2011 deemed to have come into operation on 24 August,
2010) and substituted by s. 7 (1) (l) of Act No. 24 of 2011 deemed to have come into operation as from the
commencement of years of assessment commencing on or after 1 October, 2011 in the case of any foreign partnership
that is established or formed before 24 August, 2010, and as from the date of establishment or formation in the case of
any foreign partnership that is established or formed on or after 24 August, 2010.]
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C. Comparison of article 5 in terms of the current OECD, UN and SADC MTCs
Art
5
2014 OECD MTC 2011 UN MTC 2011 SADC MTC
(1) For the purposes of this
of business through which the
business of an enterprise is wholly
or partly carried on.
For the purposes of this
of business through which the
business of an enterprise is wholly
or partly carried on.
For the purposes of this
of business through which the
business of an enterprise is wholly
or partly carried on.
(2)
a) a place of management;
b) a branch;
c) an office;
d) a factory;
e) a workshop, and
f) a mine, an oil or gas well, a
quarry or any other place of
extraction of natural resources.
rmanent
(a) A place of management;
(b) A branch;
(c) An office;
(d) A factory;
(e) A workshop;
(f) A mine, an oil or gas well, a
quarry or any other place of
extraction of natural resources.
(a) a place of management;
(b) a branch;
(c) an office;
(d) a factory;
(e) a workshop;
(f) a mine, an oil or gas well, a
quarry or any other place of
extraction or exploitation of natural
resources; and
(g) an installation or structure used
for the exploration for natural
resources provided that the
installation or structure continues
for a period of not less than
(3) A building site or construction or
installation project constitutes a
permanent establishment only if it
lasts more than twelve months.
(a) A building site, a construction,
assembly or installation project or
supervisory activities in connection
therewith, but only if such site,
project or activities last more than
six months;
(b) The furnishing of services,
including consultancy services, by
an enterprise through employees
or other personnel engaged by the
enterprise for such purpose, but
only if activities of that nature
continue (for the same or a
connected project) within a
Contracting State for a period or
periods aggregating more than 183
days in any 12-month period
commencing or ending in the fiscal
year concerned.
include:
a) a building site, a construction,
assembly or installation project or
any supervisory activity in
connection with such site or
project, but only where such site,
project or activity continues for a
period of more than .......... months;
(b) the furnishing of services,
including consultancy services, by
an enterprise through employees
or other personnel engaged by an
enterprise for such purpose, but
only where activities of that nature
continue (for the same or a
connected project) within the
Contracting State for a period or
periods exceeding in the aggregate
-month
period commencing or ending in
the fiscal year concerned;
(c) for an individual, the performing
of services in a Contracting State
by that individual, but only if the
in that State, for
the purpose of performing those
services, is for a period or periods
within any twelve month period
commencing or ending in the fiscal
year concerned.
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(4) Notwithstanding the preceding
provisions of this Article, the term
deemed not to include:
a) the use of facilities solely for the
purpose of storage, display or
delivery of goods or merchandise
belonging to the enterprise;
b) the maintenance of a stock of
goods or merchandise belonging to
the enterprise solely for the
purpose of storage, display or
delivery;
c) the maintenance of a stock of
goods or merchandise belonging to
the enterprise solely for the
purpose of processing by another
enterprise;
d) the maintenance of a fixed place
of business solely for the purpose
of purchasing goods or
merchandise or of collecting
information, for the enterprise;
e) the maintenance of a fixed place
of business solely for the purpose
of carrying on, for the enterprise,
any other activity of a preparatory
or auxiliary character;
f) the maintenance of a fixed place
of business solely for any
combination of activities mentioned
in subparagraphs a) to e), provided
that the overall activity of the fixed
place of business resulting from
this combination is of a preparatory
or auxiliary character.
Notwithstanding the preceding
provisions of this Article, the term
deemed not to include:
(a) The use of facilities solely for
the purpose of storage or display of
goods or merchandise belonging to
the enterprise;
(b) The maintenance of a stock of
goods or merchandise belonging to
the enterprise solely for the
purpose of storage or display;
(c) The maintenance of a stock of
goods or merchandise belonging to
the enterprise solely for the
purpose of processing by another
enterprise;
(d) The maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for the
purpose of purchasing goods or
merchandise or of collecting
information, for the enterprise;
(e) The maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for the
purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any other activity of a
preparatory or auxiliary character.
(f) The maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for any
combination of activities mentioned
in subparagraphs (a) to (e),
provided that the overall activity of
the fixed place of business
resulting from this combination is of
a preparatory or auxiliary
character.
Notwithstanding the preceding
provisions of this Article, the term
deemed not to include:
(a) The use of facilities solely for
the purpose of storage or display of
goods or merchandise belonging to
the enterprise;
(b) The maintenance of a stock of
goods or merchandise belonging to
the enterprise solely for the
purpose of storage or display;
(c) The maintenance of a stock of
goods or merchandise belonging to
the enterprise solely for the
purpose of processing by another
enterprise;
(d) The maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for the
purpose of purchasing goods or
merchandise or of collecting
information, for the enterprise;
(e) The maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for the
purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any other activity of a
preparatory or auxiliary character.
(f) The maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for any
combination of activities mentioned
in subparagraphs (a) to (e),
provided that the overall activity of
the fixed place of business
resulting from this combination is of
a preparatory or auxiliary
character.
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraphs 1 and 2, where a
person other than an agent of
an independent status to whom
paragraph 6 applies is acting on
behalf of an enterprise and has,
and habitually exercises, in a
Contracting State an authority to
conclude contracts in the name of
the enterprise, that enterprise shall
be deemed to have a permanent
establishment in that State in
respect of any activities which that
person undertakes for the
enterprise, unless the activities of
such person are limited to those
mentioned in paragraph 4 which, if
exercised through a fixed place of
business, would not make this fixed
place of business a permanent
establishment under the provisions
of that paragraph.
Notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraphs 1 and 2, where a
person other than an agent of an
independent status to whom
paragraph 7 applies is acting in a
Contracting State on behalf of an
enterprise of the other Contracting
State, that enterprise shall be
deemed to have a permanent
establishment in the first-
mentioned Contracting State in
respect of any activities which that
person undertakes for the
enterprise, if such a person:
(a) Has and habitually exercises in
that State an authority to conclude
contracts in the name of the
enterprise, unless the activities of
such person are limited to those
mentioned in paragraph 4 which, if
exercised through a fixed place of
business, would not make this fixed
place of business a permanent
establishment under the provisions
of that paragraph; or
Notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraphs 1 and 2, where a
person other than an agent of an
independent status to whom
paragraph 6 applies is acting on
behalf of an enterprise and has,
and habitually exercises, in a
Contracting State an authority to
conclude contracts in the name of
the enterprise, that enterprise shall
be deemed to have a permanent
establishment in that State in
respect of any activities which that
person undertakes for the
enterprise, unless the activities of
such person are limited to those
mentioned in paragraph 4 which, if
exercised through a fixed place of
business, would not make this fixed
place of business a permanent
establishment under the provisions
of that paragraph.
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(b) Has no such authority, but
habitually maintains in the first-
mentioned State a stock of goods
or merchandise from which he
regularly delivers goods or
merchandise on behalf of the
enterprise.
(6) An enterprise shall not be deemed
to have a permanent establishment
in a Contracting State merely
because it carries on business in
that State through a broker,
general commission agent or any
other agent of an independent
status, provided that such persons
are acting in the ordinary course of
their business.
Notwithstanding the preceding
provisions of this Article, an
insurance enterprise of a
Contracting State shall, except in
regard to re-insurance, be deemed
to have a permanent establishment
in the other Contracting State if it
collects premiums in the territory of
that other State or insures risks
situated therein through a person
other than an agent of an
independent status to whom
paragraph 7 applies.
An enterprise shall not be deemed
to have a permanent establishment
in a Contracting State merely
because it carries on business in
that State through a broker,
general commission agent or any
other agent of an independent
status, provided that such persons
are acting in the ordinary course of
their business.
(7) The fact that a company which is a
resident of a Contracting State
controls or is controlled by a
company which is a resident of the
other Contracting State, or which
carries on business in that other
State (whether through a
permanent establishment or
otherwise), shall not of itself
constitute either company a
permanent establishment of the
other.
An enterprise of a Contracting
State shall not be deemed to have
a permanent establishment in the
other Contracting State merely
because it carries on business in
that other State through a broker,
general commission agent or any
other agent of an independent
status, provided that such persons
are acting in the ordinary course of
their business. However, when the
activities of such an agent are
devoted wholly or almost wholly on
behalf of that enterprise, and
conditions are made or imposed
between that enterprise and the
agent in their commercial and
financial relations which differ from
those which would have been
made between independent
enterprises, he will not be
considered an agent of an
independent status within the
meaning of this paragraph.
Notwithstanding the preceding
provisions of this Article, an
insurance enterprise of a
Contracting State shall, except in
regard to re-insurance, be deemed
to have a permanent establishment
in the other Contracting State if it
collects premiums in the territory of
that other State or insures risks
situated therein through a person
other than an agent of an
independent status to whom
paragraph 6 applies.
(8) The fact that a company which is a
resident of a Contracting State
controls or is controlled by a
company which is a resident of the
other Contracting State, or which
carries on business in that other
State (whether through a
permanent establishment or
otherwise), shall not of itself
constitute either company a
permanent establishment of the
other.
The fact that a company which is a
resident of a Contracting State
controls or is controlled by a
company which is a resident of the
other Contracting State, or which
carries on business in that other
State (whether through a
permanent establishment or
otherwise), shall not of itself
constitute either company a
permanent establishment of the
other.
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